Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 4.djvu/347

CASES ANALOGOUS TO TRADE-MARKS. 331 tion. In the first case, the American Waltham Watch Company asked for an injunction against the use of the words "Waltham Watch" by the United States Watch Company. Both corpora- tions are established at Waltham, — the defendant recently, the plaintiff for many years. The watches of the plaintiff have a world-wide reputation under the name of "Waltham" watches. The evidence proved to the satisfaction of the court that the defend- ants were trying unfairly to obtain the benefit of the plaintiff's reputation. Mr. Justice Holmes granted an injunction against the use of the words "Waltham Watch" or "Waltham Watches," alone or in combination. In the second case, the plaintiff had established some fifty years ago a clothing-store on Dock square, in Boston, which he has always painted a vivid blue, and which he called, and still calls, "The Blue Store Clothing House." Owing to large expenditures in adver- tising, the plaintiff's store has become widely known under this name, and acquired a reputation for excellence. Within a few weeks the plaintiff gave up a shop adjoining his own building which he had used for several years in connection with his busi- ness, and which had been painted the same color as his main building." Before leaving, the plaintiff was careful to paint this shop brown. The defendants leased this shop immediately on the expiration of the plaintiff's lease, painted it the same blue aa the plaintiff's, — an expensive and unusual color, — and advertised in various ways as the "Blue Store Clothing House." The evidence disclosed to the satisfaction of the court a scheme to obtain the bene- fit of the plaintiff's laboriously earned reputation, and Mr. Justice Charles Allen granted an injunction, but only against the use of the words "Blue Store" alone or in combination. The question in all these cases seems now to be how far the court will go.^ Is the court bound by the analogy of trade-marks proper? Will the court refuse an injunction because the words or signs are such that they would not be a valid trade-mark? Will the court hesitate because the word or sign is of such a descrip- tion that no one can have an exclusive right to it? The cases I have cited seem to me to answer these questions decisively. The principle is the prevention of fraud in each specific case, whether its manifestation be by color, or word, or sign, or mark. The court, finding that in a certain case the fraud which is likely to deceive and does deceive the public and induce them to buy the goods of