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122 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. the administration of the entire estate ; for the first decree in such a suit is in effect a declaration that the court takes possession of the entire estate for the purpose of administering it; and, there- fore, no other court can be permitted to enforce any claim against it. The moment that such a decree is made, the executor becomes amenable to the court which makes the decree, in respect to all his official acts ; and hence that court will not thereafter permit any of the executor's official acts to be either directed or ques- tioned by any other court. Such a decree has in fact the same effect, in giving the court exclusive jurisdiction over the estate, that the appointment of a receiver would have. It does not, indeed, and cannot, convert the executor into a receiver. The executor's legal rights and legal duties remain unchanged, and the exercise of the one and the performance of the other are interfered with only so far as the purposes of justice require. Accordingly, the execu- tor is left for the most part to convert the estate into money, without interference ; but when the estate has been converted into money, the court reserves to itself the disposition of that money, and, therefore, the executor is required, as has been seen, to pay it into court, and if he pays any of it out in the discharge of the testator's debts or legacies, he will do so at his peril, as the court will give him no other protection than to permit him to stand in the place of those whom he has paid. 1 The conclusion therefore is, that as soon as a decree is made against an executor, under which the entire estate of his testator will be administered, or (in other words) under which the executor will be required to pay the proceeds of the whole estate into court, an injunction ought to be granted against the enforcement of any claim against the estate by an action at law; and accordingly such has been the established rule for more than a hundred years. An injunction was granted, under such circumstances, for the first time, by Lord Camden, in 1767, in the case of Douglas v. Olay; 2 but the reasons of the decision have not been reported, and the injunc- tion may have been granted on a special ground ; for the executor was there sued at law by the very persons who had obtained the decree in equity against him, and who may, therefore, have been held to have made their election between law and equity. The 1 Jones v. Jukes, 2 Ves. Jun. 518; Mitchelson v. Piper, 8 Sim. 64; Irby z/. Irby, 24 Beav. 525. 2 Cited in Brooks v. Reynolds, 1 Bro. C. C. 183, 184; s. c. Dick. 393.