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142 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. technical trade-mark, they were removed by the Leather Cloth Company's case ; and it is equally certain that that case did not destroy or displace the force of Lord Langdale's reasoning as laid down in Croft v. Day, except, perhaps, to the extent that it struck out certain loose expressions which were not of the substance of his argument. Some years later there arose in the House of Lords the case of Wotherspoon v. Currie, 1 cited with approval in the opinion before us, in which the doctrine of Croft v. Day was in effect ap- proved in a number of opinions of exceptional value. And at the end of the century we have the opinion of Chief Justice Fuller, and a recognition of the existence of the two kinds of cases: (i) those dependent upon a right of property, and (2) those dependent upon fraud, whereby the earlier cases and the thought and learning of the past are harmonized and made to run hand in hand. The leading and authoritative adjudications which have been mentioned are supplemented by many others of more or less significance, which have tended in the same direction, and to strengthen and make safe the solutions which have been accom- plished. The precedents cited by Chief Justice Fuller are among the best and most instructive examples which relate to the subject of unfair competition in business. To them might have been added others in which imitations of collocations of words, styles of packages and labels, characteristic signs, ornamentation of coaches, and analogous indicia have been restrained. The cases of this nature may be divided into two classes: (1) those which relate to the use of things which appeal to the eye, and (2) those which relate to the use of words. Concerning the former, it may be said that it is not clear that the law is not in an unsettled condition, while in respect of the latter class very little remains to be explored. The cases which relate to unfair competition by means of words, and symbols which are the equivalents of words, are, when under- stood, harmonious, and to one effect. The rule deducible from them is the rule of Croft v. Day, no more, no less ; and that rule is this : — Courts of equity will direct the manner in which words that are 1 L. R. 5 H. L. 508.