Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 5.djvu/160

144 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. measure the character of the defendant's use of plaintiffs word- symbol ; but they have power only to direct and regulate, and not power to prohibit. " When the common law" (say the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts) " developed the doctrine of trade-marks and trade-names it was not creating a property in advertisements (or in names) more absolute than it would have allowed the author of 'Paradise Lost; ' but the meaning was to prevent one man from palming off his goods as another's, from getting another's business or injuring his reputation by unfair means." 1 The true distinction is nowhere more clearly illustrated than in Russia Cement Co. v. Le Page, 2 which was decided by the same court as the case which has just been cited. The designation at issue was " Le Page's Liquid Glue," which the defendant, Le Page, had made over to the plaintiff, which he had subsequently used in violation of his covenants, and the use of which he sought to justify on the ground that he could not be prevented from making use of his own name. The court said : "We are of opinion, therefore, that the defendant should be enjoined from using the words ' Le Page's Improved Liquid Glue,' or ' Le Page's Liquid Glue,' to describe the article manufactured by him. ... In order to avoid misunderstanding, we add that, while the defendant cannot use the words adopted as a trade-name for the article manufactured by him, we do not decide that he may not use the words ' Liquid Glue ' or other appropriate words to describe his product, or to state in that connection that he is himself the manufacturer of it." The distinction here pointed out is not an artificial or unim- portant one. The decision is that the name " Le Page " and the term " Liquid Glue " may both be used by the defendant, but not in the form and manner practised by the complainant. There is thus a recognition of the ancient and long-settled rules of the common law, and, at the same time, an efficient application of those which contemplate the prevention of unfair competition. And it may not be going too far to say that the opinion of Chief Justice Fuller and the precedents which are cited therein weaken, if they do not actually break, the supposed significance of not a few of the earlier cases in which the distinctions now said to be of controlling importance are lost sight of. 1 Chadwick v. Covell, 151 Mass. 190. a 147 Mass. 206.