Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 5.djvu/178

162 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. This language looks very much like deciding that an express power conferred to issue bonds for the special purpose of building a school-house, or purchasing land for school purposes, does not extend to a funding of the indebtedness thus created, so as to authorize the issue of funding bonds to meet and pay off that indebtedness. But inasmuch as the plaintiff appears to have rested his case mainly upon the broader rights that flow from a power to borrow money, and since the opinion treats this latter position as the turning-point upon which to dispose of the case, it is apparent that the views just presented ought not to be taken as binding the court further than the special circumstances of this case warrant. The question of the power to issue a funding bond as incident to a power originally conferred to create the debt may thus, we think, be said to remain as yet undecided by the Supreme Court of the United States. As a matter of fact, the point does not appear to have been fully argued or fully considered by the court. Inasmuch as funding bonds in most instances are issued under the authority of a special act of the legislature, or under a general law authorizing towns to fund their indebtedness, the precise question is perhaps not likely to come before the court for determination. The plaintiff's counsel relied mainly upon an implied authority in the town of Monticello to borrow money for meeting its maturing bonds. The existence of such a power, they contended, was settled law in Indiana. They cited Dillon on Municipal Corpora* tions, and, among other authorities, the following language from the opinion of the court in the City of Richmond v. McGirr: 1 — " We think the doctrine is well established in this State, that cor- porations possess all the necessary incidental powers to carry into full operation all their expressly granted powers, and for such purposes may legally execute commercial paper, such as negotiable bonds, in the absence of any restriction in their charter or fraud in the parties." Plaintiff also relied upon the principle recognized in Claiborne County v. Brooks, 2 as stated by Bradley, J. : — "It is undoubtedly a question of local policy with each State, what shall be the extent and character of the powers which its various polit- i 78 Ind. 198. * in U. S. 410.