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1VOTES. 287 of Congress. The court ruled also that the indictment was sufficient. Another section of the act mentioned particularly public employe's. The fact that they were not mentioned in the section on which the indictment was based, the court said, was conclusive proof that the act was intended to apply to all persons who happened to be within public buildings, whether employed there or not. It was therefore immaterial to allege that the solicitation was made to government employe's. It might perhaps be suggested that Congress did not intend to protect mere strangers in the government buildings from annoyance, and that the omission to insert the words "government employes" in this section of the act was unintentional. Certainly the object for which the act was passed would be fully satisfied by that construction. In this case of course the demurrer should have succeeded, as the offence aimed at by the statute was not set out. The result reached, however, is eminently satisfactory from a practical standpoint, for it will give the greatest possible efficiency to a useful law. Weavers' Fines Act declared Unconstitutional. — The re- cent decision 1 of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts declaring unconstitutional the "Weavers' Fines Act," passed by the State Legislature of 1891, is noteworthy, as giving a narrow interpretation of the constitutional power to make " all manner of wholesome and reasonable orders . . . not repugnant to the Constitution . . . for the good and welfare " of the public. The act in question is as follows : " No employer shall impose a fine upon or withhold the wages, or any part of the wages, of an employe* engaged at weaving, for imperfections that may arise during the process of weaving." The view of the court is that the act is unconstitutional, in that it interferes with the inalienable right of " acquiring, possessing, and protecting property " guaranteed by the State Constitution, by restricting the necessarily incidental right to make reasonable contracts, and in that it impairs the obligation of contracts within the meaning of the Federal Constitution. The court admits that the Legislature, if it should " determine it to be for the best interests of the people that a certain class of employe's should not be permitted to subject themselves to an arbitrary imposition of a fine or penalty by their employer, might pass a law to that effect." But they say, " When the attempt is to compel payment under a contract of the price for good work when only inferior work is done, a different question is presented." They find a practical argument in support of their view, in the fact that a suit for damages against the employe' for breach of contract would in most cases be of no value to the employer. Judge Holmes alone dissents from the opinion of the majority and holds the act constitutional. He denies that it in any way impairs the obligation of contracts, for the simple reason that its operation is prospective, and it can scarcely be said to impair the obligation of con- tracts made after its passage. Nor does it interfere with the right of " acquiring, possessing, and protecting property," any more than the laws against usury or gaming. It is a fair assumption that the act was passed to protect employe's from being " often cheated out of a part of their wages under a false pretence that the work done was imperfect." ■ ■ ■ — — ■ » » Com. v. Perry, 28 N. E. Rep. na6.