Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 8.djvu/131

NOTES. 115 Judicial inquiry (18 Court of Claims, 700). The only other instance involved the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims in the principal case. A special act referring the cause was submitted to President Harrison on Dec. 20, 1892, and was signed by him on Dec. 28th. Meanwhile, on Dec. 22d, Congress had adjourned for the holidays to Jan. 3, 1893. Thus the bill was signed after an adjournment and within ten days after its presentation. Although the latter case is one of an adjournment for a recess and before the expiration of a congressional term, Judge Nott makes no distinction between it and the first instance where the bill was signed, not only after the close of a session, but even after the congres- sional term had expired. He would thus make his decision of general application. The power of approving a bill after the adjournment of Congress is at least not forbidden by the Constitution, and as the disputed point does • not involve any limitation on the powers of the States, but simply a ques- tion of procedure, the rule of construction that expressio unius est exdusio alterius does not apply. Can the power then be reasonably inferred? 'J'he last part of clause two provides that a bill shall not become a law if Congress adjourns within ten days after the bill has been presented to the President, but refers only to cases where the bill is not signed. The first part of the clause reads : " Every bill . . . shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President ; . . . if he approve, he shall sign it ; but if not, he shall return it with his objections to that House in which it shall have originated." If the injunction " if he approve he shall sign it " is to be regarded as absolute, complete in itself, and is not to be considered conjunctively with the clause providing for the return of the bill, the case would be clear. The House Judiciary Committee raised the objection that under such an interpretation the President could hold a bill ten months as well as ten days after adjournment. But the objection seems well met by the fact that the Constitution has fixed ten days as a sufficient time for the consideration of bills while Congress is in session, and it is reasonable to suppose that the same limit should apply although an ad- journment of Congress intervene. A greater difficulty lies in the fact that the injunctions " he shall sign " and " he shall return " are so con- nected and dependent that it seems to have been intended that the Presi- dent, at the time of acting upon a bill, should have the option of signing or vetoing it. But if he veto the bill, he must return it with his objections to the House in which it originated ; and if that House has adjourned, it is no longer possible for him to exercise his right of veto. The alterna- tive being taken away, it would seem to follow that the right of approval was also gone. The " pocket veto," it is true, would have the same effect as if the bill had been returned by the President with his objections, but it must be remembered that the " pocket veto " is not properly a veto, and was never intended as an active measure of disapproval. Its very object was to provide for cases of inaction on the part of the Executive. There are a few cases involving the interpretation of a similar clause in some of the State Constitutions. In New York and Georgia it has been held that the Governor may sign a bill within ten days after it is presented, although the Legislature has adjourned (30 Barb. 24 ; 21 N. Y. 517 ; 41 Ga. 157). But in each of these States the Governor had exer- cised the right for some time before the cases arose, and a contrary de- cision would have resulted in serious consequences. In the Georgia case the judge stated that as an original question, apart from usage, he would