Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 8.djvu/133

RECENT CASES. 11/ Carriers — Unreasonable Stipulation in Bill of Lading. — Held, that a stipulation in a bill of lading requiring a written claim for loss or damage to be made witi^in thirty days after the loss or damage occurs, covering a transit which may not unreasonably consume thirty days, is void for unreasonableness. Central Vermont R. R. Co. V. Soper, 59 Fed. Rep. 879 (Mass.). It is well-settled law that a carrier may limit his liability by stipulating that notice of loss shall be given within a reasonable time. Express Co. v. Caldwell, 21 Wall. 264. In Southern Express Co. v. Caperton, 44 Ala. loi, it was held that thirty days from the date of the bill of lading was not a reasonable time, while a contrary decision on similar facts was reached in United States Express Co. v. Harris, 51 Ind. 127. Whether this time would ordinarily be considered reasonable or not, the decision in the principal case seems perfectly sound. Constitutional Law — Legislative Powers — Referendum. — Held, that it was unconstitutional to provide that an act granting suffrage to women should take effect on approval of the voters either throughout the Commonwealth or in cities and towns ; also that such an act cannot constitutionally provide that it shall take effect throughout the Commonwealth on acceptance of a majority of the voters, includ- ing women specially authorized to vote on this question alone. In Re Municipal Suffrage to Women, 36 N. E. Rep. 488 (Mass.). For a discussion of this decision see 7 Harvard Law Review, 485, and 8 Harvard Law Review, 53. Constitutional Law — Right to Trial by Jury — Statutory Presumption. — Missouri statute made it criminal for an officer of a bank to receive a deposit, knowing at the time that the bank was insolvent, and further provided that the failure of such bank should be ^ prima facie evidence " of knowledge on the part of such officer that the bank was insolvent when the deposit was received. Held, that the statute did not violate the Missouri Constitution which provided that " the right to trial by jury, as heretofore enjoyed, shall remain inviolate." State v. Buck, 25 S. W. Rep. 573 (Mo.). The court follow People v. Cannon, 139 N. Y. 32, and bring out the fact, though not so clearly as is done by the New York court, that these statutory presumptions are not absolutely binding upon the jury, who are still at liberty to acquit, if they find the guilt is not proved beyond a reasonable doubt. See note on People v. Cannon, 7 Har- vard Law Review, 309. Constitutional Law — State Senate not a Continuous Body. — The con- stitution of New Jersey provides (i) that members of the state senate and assembly shall be elected yearly, and that the two houses shall meet separately on a certain day after the election, when the legislative year shall commence ; (2) that the senate shall be composed of one senator from each county, elected by the voters of the county for three years ; (3) that the senators shall be divided into three classes, so that one year the terms of the members of one class shall expire, and their successors be elected, and so on successively with each of the three classes. It was also provided by statute that in the organization of the two legislative bodies, certified copies of determination of elections shall be taken to be prima facie evidence of the right of persons therein mentioned to seats in the house. Held, that the senate was not a continuous body, so that a newly elected member could not enter it until his title had been passed on by the old members, but that it expired annually, and all members took part in its organization. Atty. General ex rel. Werts, Governor, v. Rogers et al. 28 Atl. Rep. 726 (N. J.). The distinction drawn by Beasley, C. J., between the senate of the United States and the senate of New Jersey would seem to be a sound one. It proceeds on the ground that Art. i. sect. 3, cl. 2 of the Constitution of the United States merely injparts to the Federal senate the potentiality of permanent existence ; while it is to such provisions as that contained in Art. i. sect. 3, cl. 4, giving to the senate an always existent presiding officer, that one must have recourse to prove the permanency of that body. The New Jersey Constitution has adopted the former, but not the latter, of these two clauses. Contracts — Anticipatory Breach. — Defendant contracted with plaintiff to secure to her by his will a life estate in certain lands. He aliened the lands. Held, that she could recover the present value of that estate. Synge v.Synge [1894], i Q. B. 467 (Eng.). See Notes. Contracts — Interference with. — An action lies for persuasion, by defendant, inducing third persons to break contracts with plaintiff. It is not an action for slander 16