Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 8.djvu/190

174 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. RECENT CASES. Admission of Women to Practisk at the Bar. — Under the common law and the statutes of New Hampshire a woman may be licensed to practise as an attorney. jii re Richer, 29 Atl. Rep. 559 (N. H.). This decision places New Hampshire in accord with the majority of American jurisdictions in this matter. While the English courts have not as yet seen their way to admitting a woman to practise at the bar, the old co.nmon-law doctrine has been superseded very largely in this country, sometimes by statutory construction, as in Connecticut, J/nL^s Case, 50 Conn. 131, sometimes by direct enactment, as in Massachusetts, R. S. of Mass. 1882, c. 139. The objections to allowing a woman to practise, when she could plead coverture to any suit by a client on express or implied contract, are obvious; but now that she is almost universally liable on her separate contracts, there seems to be no legal reason uhy she should not assume the duties and responsibilities of the office. Agency — -Master and Servvnt — Si.rvant not under Control of Master. — Action for injuries caused by negligence in the operation of an engine belonging to defendants, but which, together with its crew, at the time of the accident, was rented to and under the control of another company. //<?//, that defendants were not respon- sible. Byne v. Kansas City ^'c. R.Co., 61 Fed, Rep. 605. The case follows the nearly universal rule of law on this po'nt. Rourke v . Colliery Co., 2 C. P. Div. 205 ; Donovan v. Cons/ruction Syndicile, i Q. B. [1893] 629 ; Mil'er v, K. A". Co., 76 Iowa, 655. A different rule, however, prevails in Mississippi and Texas. ]. R. Co, V. Norwood, 62 Miss. 565; Bur.'on v. A'. A'. Co., 61 Tex. 526. As the court point out, however, in the opinion in the principal case, this latter rule is due to a fa lure to distinguish between such cases as the one under consideration and the car- riage cases. Laugher v. Pointer, 5 Barn. & C. 547, and Quarvian v. Burnett, 6 M. & W. 499. Agency — ViCE-Principal — Fellow-Servant. — Plaintiff, while in defendant's employ as a hod-carrier, was injured by the collapse of a scaffold upon which he was required to work. This scaffold had been erected by a carpenter employed by defend- ant for this purpose, and it was through his negligent construction of it that the accident happened. Held, that the carpenter, being a vice-principal and not a fellow- servant, defendant was responsible for his negligence. JMcNamara v. AIcDonottgh, 36 Pac. Rep. 941 (Cal.). ^ In this case we find another instance of the inaccurate use of the term " vice- principal." Here defendant was under an absolute duty to furnish suitable app iances, which he could not escape by delegating. But if plaintiff had been injured by some personal negligence of the carpenter while constructing the scaffold, it would certainly be held the negligence of a fellow-servant, for which defendant would not be liable. On the other hand, an employer is liable for all the negligence of a vice-principal, as if it were his own, in jurisdictions where the real vice-principal doctrine prevails. CoMMO.N Carrier — Negligence — Contract to Relieve from Liability IN THE Transportation of Live Stock. — Where a contract for the shipment of cattle provides that the shipper shall care for them on the journey, and relieves the carrier from all liability except for negligence, held, an unreasonable delay in transpor- tation exonerates the shipper from all further care, and the carrier must feed and water them thereafter. Ft. Worth &= D. C. I'y. Co. v. Daggett et al., 27 S. W. Rep. i83 (Tex.). The decision of the majority seems questionable on the facts recorded. The authorities on which they base their opinions, Lawson on Carriers, § 191, and Kenny V. Ra Iway, 59 Barb. 104, are cases of wilful malfeasance by the carrier involving delay in transportation which does not appear in the main case. It does appear that the accompanying drover had anple opportunity to care for the cattle after the accident occurred, but thought it was unnecessary. Granted that the drover is not guilty of contributory negligence, it seems unwarranted to hold the carrier for the mistaken opinion of a drover in regard to the needs of his stock. The rule of avoidable conse- quence also would seem to deny the right of a drover wholly to abandon cattle in case of undue delay, when it is apparent that this will greatly increase the amount of dam- ages, while they can be cared for by himself with small expenditure of time and money. Constitutional Law — Dispensary Act. — Act of December 24, 1892, forbidding the sale of liquors within the State by private individuals, and vesting the right to sdl liquors exclusively in the State by certain designated olificers and agents, the profits to