Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 8.djvu/232

2l6 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. perpetuity; hence, in a charity an " alienable right," in the sense of a perfect ownership, can never exist; therefore the property is, as it were, out of the avenues of trade, and there is no reason why one charity may not succeed another. But this reasoning is not sound. Whilst it is true that a charity may never have an " alien- able " right, in the sense of an absolute, unfettered ownership, yet it is also true that a charity should have, and must have, a right to its property within its own charitable limitations. In other words, as Professor Gray very aptly says, "The remote future interest is objectionable, because the law does not allow an interest so uncertain in value to hamper the present ownership." The charity — within the limitation of the devise being to it in per- petuity — must hold the property as free from future limitations as must the individual. The charity should have all the rights of ownership, save the right to divert the fund from the charitable purpose. Because the charity may hold property in perpetuity is no reason why the gift should not be subject to all the other rules of law. It may hold it in perpetuity, but it must hold, within this .limitation, as free as an individual must hold. The law permits property to be given to charity by reason of the public good accomplished by charity. The rule which governs the vesting of a charitable gift is the same which governs the vesting of a gift to an individual : it cannot be created to commence at a future time beyond the limits of the rule. Now, why is not the charitable gift equally subject to every other rule applicable to a gift to an individual? Giving property to charity forever is one thing. Making it a qualified ownership in this respect, e. g., that it must always be used for the benefit of a certain object, is all righ^, of course; but this is as far as the law will interfere with an absolute ownership ; no other possible exemption, etc. has been extended to charity. In all other respects, the gift must be governed as would any other gift ; hence, to make it go over on a remote condition is as bad in the case of a charity as it would be in the case of an individual ; there must be a vested right to deal with the property as any other owner could — save that it is given to an object forever. With this single limitation, then, the gift to charity must not be ham- pered by any remote future interests. It seems from Lord Cottenham's words, already quoted, that his error was this : he knew that a charity can receive a gift in per- petuity, in perpetimmy therefore he asks. What difference does