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228 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. hard to see reason why equity should not in proper cases interfere, it must be taken to be the undoubted law. It may perhaps be added that the practical value of a compelled personal service would in most cases hardly justify its enforcement. The injunction really possible and quite effective was of a different kind, however; it was in restraint of what when committed would have been a tort, — a conspiracy to induce the employees of a railroad yet in its service to withdraw. What a conspiracy precisely is no one knows. Its definition is always question-begging, and the only intelligible mean- ing of it seems to be that there is an indefinite class of offences which become conspiracies because several combine in their execution, and so render opposition by an individual more difficult ; Mr. Justice Harlan in Arthur v. Oakes, Chic. Law J., Oct. 1894, and Lord Esher in Temperton v. Russell^ 1893, I Q. B. 715. There is, however, no occasion in these cases to deal with so misty an offence as conspiracy. Taft, J, in Thompson v. C, N. O., 6- T. P. R. R. Co., 62 Fed. Rep. 803, puts the issue of injunctions upon the right ground in referring them to the law recognized first in Tetn- perton v. Russell, supra, and, though not altogether settled, at least famil- iar to lawyers. If it be a tort which a common law court will recognize to induce another not to enter into, or, as here, not to continue, a contract with the plaintiff from motives other than those which the law will admit to be proper, it is no great step to enjoin one from the proposed commis- sion of such a tort. Doubtless the precise definition of the motive which in these cases renders a defendant liable is as yet very far to seek ; but there can be little doubt that, whatever it is, that which dictates a " boy- cott " of the extent of that of last July is quite within its scope. In Judge Grosscup's charge to the grand jury (62 Fed. Rep. 828) the difficulty is dealt with, — of course now in connection with indictments, — and a large scope is left for innocent motive by requiring only that a leader of strikes mean the welfare of the members of his association. Whether that be the right line or not, the purpose in the cases in question was to benefit per- sons quite disconnected with those who conspired, and to compel the companies altogether to give up their business. Of course, when threats and violence were used, there could be no doubt of the illegality of the conspiracy. The injunctions issued pursuant to the Act of July 2, 1890, which gave Federal courts power to enjoin against any interference in restraint of interstate commerce or the passage of the mails, {U. S. v. Elliott, 62 Fed. Rep. 801 ; U. S. v. Agler, 62 Fed. Rep. 824,) stand quite alone, and do not call for comment. Last comes the "omnibus injunction" issued against the world at large by Grosscup and W'oods, JJ. It is difficult to see how such injunc- tions can stand the test of precedent or principle. An injunction issues in a civil suit_ against a party who has been complained of at least, and has had notice of the motion of his adversary. To be obliged to wait until the injunction is violated to determine against whom it was issued ought to be enough to show that it is not an injunction at all, but in the nature of a police proclamation, putting the community in general under peril of contempt if the proclamation be disobeyed. Courts of equity were evidently not intended to possess such functions, and it must be regretted that Judge Grosscup, in his mOst commendable eagerness to offset the criminal inaction of Governor Altgeld, should have been forced to such a legal anomaly. The power of a court to imprison for contempt