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230 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. what time of the last day of grace the bill or note shall be paid ; whereas the ordinary debtor has until the last moment of the day, there being no duty in the latter case on the creditor to demand payment. For collections of authorities on the subject see Ames's Cases on Bills and Notes, Vol. II. pp. 86 and 95, n. 4; also 2 Daniel on Nego- tiable Instruments, p. 241, §§ 2 and 3. Bills and Notes — Delivery in Escrow. — Held, that notes could not be delivered in escrow to the agent of the payee to hold till the maker could investigate the indebtedness for which they were given. Murray et al. v. W. W. Kimball Co., ■T,j N. E. Rep. 744 (Ind.). Although a note cannot be delivered to the payee or his agent in escrow, following the analogy of deeds (Co. Lit. 36 «), there would be an equity between the parties as to the effect of the instrument. It would be much better to do away with the technical doctrine of delivery of deeds as applying to notes, and follow the analogy of chattels. 6 Am. & Eng. Enc. 862; Ames's Cases on Bills and Notes, Vol. II. p. 99, and cases cited. Bills and Notes — Fraud — Sufficiency of Plea. — In an action on a prom- issory note by the indorsee against the maker, the latter alleged fraud in the inception of the note. The plaintiff obtained judgment on the pleadings, on the ground that the answer should have alleged that plaintiff had knowledge of the fraud at the time it was indorsed to him. On appeal it was held, that the burden of proving bona fides, which includes a want of knowledge of the fraud alleged, was upon the plaintiff, and if so the burden of pleading this want of knowledge was his also. Thamling v. Diiffey, 37 Pac. Rep. 363 (Mont.). The authorities on the question of pleading here involved are apparently in hopeless conflict, but the diversity is chiefly due to the extreme looseness with which the courts use the phrase " burden of proof." Fraud in the inception of a note is a personal defence, and is demurrable unless the action is by the payee. When an indorsee sues, the plea should also allege that the plaintiff and every one in the line through whom the plaintiff claims had notice of the fraud or gave no consideration, for the plaintiff is protected if he has succeeded to the rights of a bona fide purchaser who has intervened. At the trial, it is the duty of the plaintiff to go forward with evidence to disprove the notice or lack of consideration alleged, but the burden of establishing them remains with the defendant throughout. If a bill were brought to enforce an equity against one who had obtained the legal title to land, chattels, or notes, there could be no doubt upon whom the burden of proving notice would lie. 100 Mass. 190. The question in the principle case would seem perfectly analogous. Langdell on Equity Pleading. Carriers — Refusal to transport Freight — Tender. — A dispute having arisen between plaintiff and defendant in connection with matters not involved in this case, defendant informed plaintiff that it would not carry any more coal for plaintiff over its road. Plaintiff, relying on this statement, tendered no more coal to defendant for carriage, but subsequently, and in consequence of this refusal, was forced to give up its business, and brought suit againt defendants for refusal to transport coal. Held, the refusal of the carrier does not in the absence of tender of a definite amount for transportation amount to a waiver of such tender so as to subject the carrier to liability for loss of business caused by relying on such refusal. Wilder v. St. Johnsbury dH L. C. R. Co., 30 Atl. Rep. 41 (Vt.). The court cites no cases in its opinion, and there seems to be little authority on this iK)int, but it would seem that common sense necessitates the conclusion reached by the judges in this case. The court confines its decision to cases where the amount of property was in no way ascertained, and expressly declines to consider what plaintiffs rights would have been if the conversation between plaintiff and defendant had " related to some specific property then upon the line of defendant's road awaiting shipment, or even to some distinct proposal dependent upon the defendant's services." Chattel Mortgage — Crops to be Planted — Rights of Subsequent Pur- chaser. — Held, a chattel mortgage on crops to be thereafter planted is void as against a subequent purchaser at an execution sale. Rochester Distilling Co. v. Rasey, 37 N . E. 632 (N. Y.). It is not questioned that that which has a potential existence may be the subject of a mortgage or sale, but the court declares that the annual product of labor and cultiva- tion cannot be said to have a potential existence before planting. Upon this view the decision is brought within the authority of cases holding that a mortgage of property to be thereafter manufactured or purchased is void. Otis v. Lill, 8 Barb. 102; Gard- ner v. McEwan, 19 N. Y. 123. While deciding that crops not yet sown do not have potential existence, the court distinguishes such cases as Andrew v. Newcotnb, 32 N. Y. 417, and Caffrey v. Woodin, 65 N. Y. 459, which hold that crops not yet sown may be