Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 8.djvu/249

RECENT CASES. 233 county not liable. In that State municipal corporations proper are not liable for negligence of their servants when engaged in duties public in character from which no special corporate benefit is derived. Maximilian v. N. V., 62 N. Y. 164, and cases cited. The decisions in Massachusetts accord with this view. H(nuard. Worcester, 153 Mass. 426 (1891;. The matter is discussed at length in ///// v. Boston, 122 Mass. 344. The rule as to counties is approved in HolUnheck v. Winnebago Co , 95 111. 148; Summers v. County, 103 Ind. 262 ; Sherbourne v. Yuba County, 21 Cal. 113; Kincaid v. Harden Co., 53 la. 430. Harmon v. St. Louis Co., 62 Mo. 313, and Bigelow v. Randolph, 41 Gray, 541, approve the rule as laid down, but hold that it does not apply where a special duty is imposed upon the quasi corporation with its consent. The authorities are collected in the principal case, in Dillon on Municipal Corporations at the sections cited, and in Hill v. Boston, supra. Criminal Law — Homicide — Passion from Mere Words. — In an appeal from a conviction of murder in the first degree, the act of the defendant having been the result of a quarrel, it was held, that passion aroused by mere words cannot reduce homicide below the offence of murder in the second degree. Smith v. State, 15 So. Rep. 843 (Ala.). The court say that no principle in our criminal jurisprudence is more firmly estab- lished than this one. Yet while it is true as a general rule that mere words are not sufficient provocation to reduce the offence to manslaughter, this statement of the principle seems to be too strong. A recent English case (Regina v. Rothwell, 12 Cox C. C. 145), while admitting the rule, holds that there may be circumstances which would warrant a departure from it, and lays down what appears to be a better rule, that the provocation, whether by words or otherwise, must be sufficient to cause an ordinary man to act as the defendant did. The result reached in the principal case is however perfectly sound on the facts. Equity — Rescission of a Deed given with Intent to Defraud Credi- tors. — Where an owner, being apprehensive of an adverse termination to a suit in which he is involved, conveys his property to another without consideration, and with intent to defeat the recovery of a possible judgment, held, that he may not, after a judgment in his favor, invoke the aid of a court of equity to compel his grantee to reconvey. Pride v. Andrew, 38 N. E. Rep. 84 (Ohio). The Ohio statute rendering fraudulent conveyances void as against attaching credi tors is practically a re-enactment of the statute of Elizabeth ; but it is everywhere held that this doctrine has no application as between the parties and their representatives. Equity will not allow a fraudulent grantor to impeach his deed or revoke an executed contract. There is a line of cases which perhaps may be regarded as laying down a modification of the general rule, holding that the grantor may compel reconveyance if the parties are not in pari delicto. Story, Eq. Jur. § 300 ; Boyd v. De La Montaignie, 73 N. Y. 498; Boston v. Batch, 69 Mo. 1x5. But to claim the benefit of this exception the plaintiff must make out a very clear case of undue influence on the part of his grantee. As such extenuating circumstances did not appear in the main case, relief was rightly refused. Evidence — Privilege — Confidential Communications. — Defendant, a phy- sician, having been sued for malpractice, attempted to put in evidence certain occur- rences at the examination of the plaintiff. A statute provides that such occurrences and the results of such examinations should be confidential communications, — not to be disclosed without the consent of the patient. Held, when the patient sues the plaintiff for malpractice, the privilege is waived. Becknell v. Hosier, 37 N. E. Rep. 580 (Ind). This seems to be a new question, as no authorities are cited by the court and none are to be found in the text-books. On principle, however, there can be no doubt of the correctness of the decision ; for, if this privilege were held to be available to the client in such a case, the physician would never be able to defend himself. In an early Indiana case, — Nave v. Baird, 12 Ind. 318, — it was held that in an action against an attorney for malpractice this privilege must be considered waived, and of course there is no practical difference between the two cases. Fraud — Conveyance to avoid Attaching Creditors — Notice. — Where an absolute conveyance of land is made for a consideration grossly inadequate, the grantor retaining a valuable interest in the estate, and both parties acting with intent . to embarrass creditors, held, such conveyance is void, not only against existing, but also against subsequent creditors and purchasers with or without notice. Jones v. Light, 30 Atl. Rep. 71 (Me.). The authorities are in conflict on the question involved in this case. The conclu- sion reached is sustained by rulings in Massachusetts, Tennessee, and Kentucky. The