Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 8.djvu/274

258 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. and the common law, prior to Assumpsit, recognized only those parol contracts which were based upon a quid pro quo. The jurisdiction of Equity was rarely invoked upon breaches of promises after the development of Assumpsit, unless specific per-«^ formance of the contract was desired. We have only to consider, therefore, the nature of the common-law real contracts which were enforced by the actions of Debt, Detinue, and Account. It is not necessary to deal specially with Account, since the essential principles of that action have been clearly and fully set forth by Professor Langdell in the second volume of this Review.^ It will suffice to emphasize the fact that a defendant's duty to account, whether as bailiff or receiver, arose from his receipt of property as a trustee, and that a plaintiff entitled to an account was strictly a cestui que trust. In other words, trusts for the pay- ment of money were enforced at common law long before Chan- cery gave effect to trusts of land. It need not surprise us, therefore, to find that upon the delivery of money by A to B to the use of C, or to be delivered to C, C might maintain an action of Account against B.^ Account against a receiver was long ago superseded by the common count for money had and received by the defend- ant to the use of the plaintiff. But the words " to the use of" still bear witness to the trust relation. Detinue was usually founded upon the contract of bailment. This contract was a real contract by reason of the delivery of a chattel by the bailor to the bailee. The duty of the bailee was commonly to redeliver the same chattel to the bailor, either upon demand or at some time fixed by the terms of the bailment. But the chattel might be delivered to the bailee to be delivered to a third person, in which case the third person was allowed to main- tain Detinue against the bailee.^ Detinue would also lie against a seller upon a bargain and sale. H^re it was the payment of the purchase-money that as a rule 1 Pages 242-257. See also Pollock, Cont. (6th ed.), 137, and the observations of the same writer in 6 Harv. Law Rev., 401, 402. 2 (32 Ed. III.) Fitz. Ab. Acct. 108; (2 Rich. II.) Bellewe Acct. 7; Y. B. 41 Ed. III. lo-s; Y. B. 6 Hen. IV. 7-33; Y. B. i Hen. V. ii-2i; Y. B. 36 Hen. VI. 9, 10-5; Y. B. 18 Ed. IV. 23-5; Y. B. I Ed. V. 2-2; Robsert v. Andrews, Cro. El. 82; Hunt- ley V. Griffith, Gold. 159; Harrington v. Rotheram, Hob. 36, Brownl. 26 s. c; Clark's Case, Godb. 210, pi. 299. See also Ames, Cases on Trusts (2d ed.), i n. 3, 4 n. i. 8 Y. B. 34 Ed. I. 239; Y. B. 12 & 13 Ed. III. 244; Y. B. 39 Ed. III. 17, A; Y. B. 3 Hen. VI. 43-20: Y.B. 9 Hen. VI. 38-13; Y. B. 9 Hen. VI. 60, A-8 ; Y. B. 18 Hen. VI. 9, A-7, and other authorities cited in Ames, Cases on Trusts (2d ed.), 52 n. i.