Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 8.djvu/519

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HARVARD LAW REVIEW.
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RECENT CASES. 503 he had been, he would have been engaged in a fraud, and it is now well settled that in such a case notice of the agent is not imputable to the principal, i Am. and Eng. Ency. of Law, 423. Agency — Liability of Master for Negligence of Servant appointed by A Servant. — The driver of a bus, being drunk, was forbidden by the police to drive any more at the time, and ordered from the box. He went inside, and, the conductor acquiescing, induced Veares (a former omnibus conductor) to drive the bus home, and by the negligent driving of Veares plaintiff was injured. It did not appear that the driver and conductor had authority to get another driver in cases of this sort. Hfld, that defendants are liable, affirming the judgment of Chalmers, J. Gwilliam v. Tivist &> another, 11 The Times Law Rep. 208 (Q. B. D.). Mr. Justice Lawrence bases his decision on the fact that defendants acquiesced in the driving of Veares, and that he was authorized by the conductor and driver. Mr. Justice Wright, however, goes further and says, " The law is this : that in cases of sudden emergency, the servant may have authority, within the scope of the employ- ment, to act in good faith, and according to the best of his judgment, for his employ- er's interest, provided that he violates no express limitation of his authority, and no order of the master applicable to the case, and provided that the act be not plainly unreasonable " ; the Judge below may have found such an emergency here, and so the judgment will not be disturbed. No authority is cited by Mr. Justice Wright for this view, and the question seems to be a novel one. There must exist some authority of this sort, for it is not to be expected that the bus is to be driven up to the side of the road and held there until communication can be had with the proprietors. A still more complicated question would arise if this had been a hack. See Notes. Agency — Liability of Members of a College Class for Class Book. — A college class voted at a class meeting to publish a certain book, and elected a member of the class business manager of the publication. Held, the members of the class present at the meeting, either voting or assenting to the vote, are personally liable for the expense of publication. The business manager acted within the scope of his employment in contracting with the printer. Wilcox v. Arnold, 39 N. E. Rep. 414 (Mass.). Such contracts are so commonly entered into by college classes and other college organizations, that the case is interesting as determining just what is the liability of members. Bills and Notes —Uncertainty in Amount. — Held, a bill of exchange for the payment of a certain sum " with exchange," is not negotiable. Culbertson v. Nelson, 61 N. W. Rep. 854 (la.). The authorities on this point are in great conflict, and are well collected in the opin- ion, which professes to decide the point on strict principle. It is submitted that exchange, like interest, is incidental ; indeed, it is difficult to see how the case of a demand note bearing interest can be distinguished from this case. When a note is sold away from the place of making, the question of exchange is always considered. In Sperry v. Hoar, 32 Iowa, 184, it was decided that the addition of an agreement to pay attorney's fees did not affect the negotiability of a note. The court distinguish the cases by saying that in the latter the amount of money due at maturity was not uncer- tain, because the agreement referred only to the remedy if the note was unpaid. In Bank V. Laughlin, 61 N. W. Rep. 473 (S. D.), it has just been decided that such an agreement to pay the expenses of collection rendered an instrument otherwise good in form non-negotiable. Carriers — Arrival at Destination — Termination of Liability as Com- mon Carrier. — Plaintiff shipped goods on defendant's road consigned to himself. He did not reside nor had he an agent at the place of consignment, and his residence was unknown to defendant. The car containing the goods arrived at the place of consign- ment, and the goods were left on the car for forty-eight hours after arrival, when they were stolen from the car. Held, in the case of portable packages of valuable merchan- dise, the liability of a railway company as common carrier does not terminate until the goods are removed from the cars and placed in its freight-room, ready for delivery to the consignee, and the consignee has had a reasonable time thereafter to remove them. To allow the carrier to terminate his liability for such kinds of goods by any less formal and expressive act would be against public policy. Kirk v. Chicago, St. P., M., Of O. Ry. Co., 60 N. W. Rep. 1084 (Minn.). The court take judicial notice of a general custom to deliver this kind of freight from the freight-room, and not from the car. As the goods were not unloaded at all^