Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 8.djvu/523

RECENT CASES. SO/ York rule, holding repetitions after the beginning of the suit inadmissible merely be- cause that would lead to assessing damages twice for the same act, JDaly v. Byrne, 77 N. Y. 182. Electric Railway — Additional Servitude — Telephone Company — Re- spective Rights. — A telephone company strung wires along the street, under a statute which authorized it so to construct its line, provided the ordinary use of the street was not obstructed. Afterward, a street railway company substituted electricity for horses as a motive power, thereby seriously impairing the telephone service. Held, (i) that the railway, operated by the overhead, single trolley system, was within the ordinary use of the street as intended by the statute. (2) That the railway company was liable to the telephone company for expenses incurred in erecting higher poles to prevent the telephone wires conflicting with those of the former company, the railway company having needlessly placed its poles on the side of the street occupied by the telephone company. (3) That the railway company was not liable for the induction caused in the telephone wires by its own stronger current, the existence of the weaker telephone current in the street being viewed as "such obstruction of the street as plain- tiff is forbidden to create." (4) That, as the current required for the single-wire system of the telephone caused " no hurtful disturbance of natural electrical conditions," and as the violent and varying currents of the railway did cause such disturbance, whereby the telephone service was impaired by conduction or leakage through the earth, the railway company was liable for the damage thus incurred. Two justices dissent upon the first point, another upon the second, and two others upon the fourth. Cumberland, &»c. Co. V. United Electric Ry. Co., 29 S. W. Rep. 104 (Tenn.). As to the first point, the leading case upon this very modern subject, lays down the rule that the mode of use, and not the motive power, is the criterion as to the existence of an additional servitude. Tag^art v. Navport Ry., 16 R. I. 668. The rule has been frequently quoted with approval, though the decision, and several subsequent ones, have seemed to hold that, in law, the ordinary electric trolley road constitutes no added burden to the fee. Halsey v. Railway, 47 N. J. Eq. 380; Railway v. Mills, 85 Mich. 634. But the text-writers agree that the question is still unsettled, and incline to a con- trary opinion. See, in addition to the authorities cited, Elliott on Roads, pp. 559-60, and some significant remarks in a late New Jersey case. IV.J. Ry. v. C. G. &> IV. Ry., 29 Atl. Rep. 423. The second point turned rather upon a finding of fact than upon a principle of law. The third and fourth points have usually been treated as one ; no decision has been found which so clearly distinguishes between the damages arising from induction and conduction, and refuses a recovery for one, while permitting it for the other. The authorities upon this precise point are meagre, the arguments having proceeded upon the analogies to air, light, and water. The majority and dissenting opinions elaborately discuss the cases which have arisen upon these questions, and the decision as a whole forms a notable addition to the learning upon this interesting branch of the law. Persons — Alienation of Affections — Wtff.'s Right to Maintain the Action under Modern Statutes. — Statutes provided in substance that a married woman should have as her separate property all rights in action growing out of the violation of any of her personal rights, and should sue in her own name. Held, that a married woman could maintain an action for the alienation of her husband's affections. Clow V. Chapman, 28 S. W. Rep. 328 (Mo.). Whether by the common law a wife had no substantive right to her husband's society and protection, or whether there was such a right, though unenforceable because of the difficulty in procedure, is the point upon which cases of this kind hinge. The older authorities held that the wife had no such right. Cooley on Torts, 227. But the wife certainly had some such right, for in the English Ecclesiastical Courts she could sue for restitution of conjugal rights. Bishop on Marriage, Divorce and Separation, §§ ^357. 1358- Accordingly when statutes have given a married woman a right to sue in her own name, thus removing the difficulty in procedure, there remains no reason why a wife should not maintain this action, and the modern authorities all agree in allowing her to do so. Haynes v. Nowlin, 129 Ind. 581 ; Bennett v. Bennett, 116 N. Y. 584- Persons — Husband and Wife — Effect of Separate Property Acts on THE Husband's Rights in an Estate in the Entirety. — Where land is granted to a husband and wife they hold as. tenants in common or joint tenants of the use dur- ing their joint lives, and on a mortgage of the land by the husband and foreclosure thereof, the grantee becomes a tenant in common with the wife during the joint lives of the husband and wife and owner in fee of the whole, if the husband survive the wife. ffiles V. Fisher, 39 N. E. Rep. 337 (N. Y.). vol, VIII, — 8 67