Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 8.djvu/79

RECENT CASES. 63 Torts — Conspiracy — To Injure Business. — "The Retail Lumber Dealers' Assn.," by its by-laws, gave an active member a claim against a wholesaler for selling to a person not a "regular dealer" in such member's community, and required mem- bers to refuse to patronize a wholesaler who ignored the committee's decisions. Plain- tiff, who was not a " regular dealer," underbid defendant on a contract; but wholesalers refused to sell to him, and he was obliged to abandon the contract because defendant, an active member of the association, had previously enforced a claim against a whole- saler who had sold to plaitjtiff, and expressed an intention of continuing to enforce such claims. Held, that defendant was liable for the amount which plaintiff lost by abandon- ing his contract, and would be perpetually enjoined from making a claim under the by-laws of the association against any person who sold to plaintiflF. Jackson et al. v. Stanfield et al., 36 N. E. Rep. 345 (Ind.). The court in an able opinion review the authorities of the several States, and reach the sound conclusion that "the great weight of authority supports the doctrine that where the policy pursued against a trade or business is of a menacing cliaracter, calcu- lated to destroy or injure the business of the person so engaged, either by threats or 'intimidation, it becomes unlawful, and the person inflicting the wrong is amenable to the injured party in a civil action for damages therefor " (p. 351). Torts — Deceit — Means of Knowledge. — Defendant falsely represented to plaintiff that he had a good title to a certain land. Plaintiff, relying on this, entered into a contract with defendant. Held, a bill to rescind the contract is not defeated by the fact that plaintiff could have ascertained the falsity of defendant's representation by examining the registry records. Baker v. Maxwell, 14 So. Rep. 468 (Ala.). The defendant admits that he lied, but says that the plaintiff was a fool to believe him, and therefore ought not to be given a remedy. This ought not to be a defence. Of course a representation may be such that no man will rely on it, and many cases apparently contrary to the doctrine laid down above were probably decided on the ground that plaintiff did not act in reliance on the representation. But the representa- tio.i here was one calculated to put the purchaser off his guard, — to induce him not to look up the title, and to prevent him from using his means of knowledge. It is sub- mitted that the plaintiff had a right to take the defendant at his word, and that the decision should be supported at law as well as in equity. For a good discussion of these principles, see i Bigelow on Fraud, 527, 530; Cottrilly. Krum, 100 Mo. 397; 2 Bish. New Cr. Law, §§ 433-436, and § 464. Torts — Imputed Negligence. — In an action for injuries to the plaintiff's wife, caused by the negligence of the defendant company, it was held, that in a State where the wife had been released of all common-law liabilities, and the husband of all respon- sibility for the wife's torts, her contributory negligence would not bar his action. Honey V. C. B. &- Q. Ry. Co., 59 Fed. Rep. 423 (Iowa). None of the authorities cited in this opinion refer to actions for loss of services, and the case rests wholly on the idea that the right of action in behalf of the husband is not derived from the wife, but originates in an injury to the husband's own right. The rule in I Shearman and Redfield on Negligence, § 71, for which authority is there cited, covers this case, leads to a more just result, and seems sounder on principle: " When a parent or master sues, for his own benefit, to recover damages for the technical loss of services of a child or servant, . . . any contributory negligence of the child or ser- vant which would suffice to bar an action brought in his name will also preclude a recovery by the parent or master." Torts — Liahility of Charitable Institution for Torts of its Servants. — Held, that a purely charitable institution established by the State is not liable to its inmates for the negligent or malicious acts of its servants. Williams v. Louisville Industrial School of Reform, 24 S. W. Rep. 1065 (Ky.). There is a conflict of authority on the point here decided. McDonald v. Massachu- setts General Hospital, I20 Mass. 432, is in accord with the principal case; Galvin v. Rhode Island Hospital, 12 R. I. 411, contra. Torts — Libel — Privileged Communication. — The defendant newspaper pub- lished an article charging the plaintiff, a candidate for nomination, with selling himself to an opposing candidate. Held, that this communication is not privileged as concern- ing a servant, or one applying for service; that privilege extends to fair comment and criticism of the acts of public men, but not to false allegations of fact. Post Pub. Co. v. Hallam, 59 Fed Rep. 530 (Ohio). The court argues that where, as in this case, the sacrifice of private rights outweighs the public benefit, privilege should cease. Davis v. Shepstone, 11 App. Cas. 187, and American cases following it, are cited with ajiproval. The decision contains a good exposition of the basis of privilege, and seems justifiable.