RECOVERY FOR CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACT, 8/ his boat the fender of a bridge on which plaintiff was at work; the blow knocked out a brace between two piles, and the piles, coming together, crushed plaintiff between them. The master was liable,, though the result of his act could not possibly have been foreseen.^ It is negligent to set going any force which according to the ordinary course of nature may bring about the act of injury. One so adjusts himself to the conditions in which he lives as to escape harm from the ordinary forces of nature ; and a person who throws him out of adjustment with his surroundings is justly held re- sponsible.^ Thus where an insurance company became responsible for a fire among electrical machinery, and the fire by melting a connecting wire caused a short circuit, which so increased the speed of the machines as to injure them, it was held that the com- pany must pay for the loss.^ Where a vessel, having negligently been allowed to strike a shoal, was drifted by the tide against plaintiff's walls, the master was responsible for the collision.* It is otherwise where an extraordinary operation of nature brings about the injury; there is no negligence in not anticipating it. So where a carrier delays the transportation of goods, which are thereupon overwhelmed by a flood, the carrier is not responsible for the loss caused by the flood.^ It is evident, however, that a voluntary human act cannot be treated Uke an act of nature. When an independent human act, subsequent to defendant's last voluntary act, forms one of the factors of the act of injury, the defendant cannot be held respon- sible on the ground of negligence unless he might have foreseen the other's act. But if he might have foreseen it, he ought to be re- sponsible for the act of injury, even though the subsequent actor was also a voluntary wrong-doer, and was also liable.^ means for rescuing the man, if he fell, that it seemed impossible that he could drown. The negligence consisted in allowing the contact of the seaman with the water, not in causing his death. See also Reg. v. Archer, i F. & F. 351. 1 Hill V. Winsor, 118 Mass. 251, Smith Cas. Torts, 48. Compare Reg. v. Horsey, 3 F. & F. 287 ; Reg. v. Serne, 16 Cox C. C. 311, Beale Cas. Crim. L. 465. 2 See a clear statement of the reason of this rule in Beven on Negligence, p. 73. 8 Lynn Gas & Electric Co. v. Meriden Ins. Co., 158 Mass. 570.
- Romney Marsh v. Trinity House, L. R. 5 Ex. 204, 7 Ex. 247, Smith Cas. Torts, i.
6 Denny v. N. Y. Cent. R. R., 13 Gray, 481 ; Smith Cas. Torts, 16. But the rule first stated applies if the act of nature were to be anticipated, as a frost in winter. Fox v. B. & M. R. R., 14S Mass. 220. ^ Guille V. Swan, 19 Johns. 381 ; Lane v. Atlantic Works, in Mass. 136. This ap- pears, perhaps, still more clearly when the two wrongful human acts are concurrent, though the principle is no doubt the same. Mathews v. Tramway Co. 60, L. T. Rep.
