Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 9.djvu/167

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HARVARD LAW REVIEW.
139

LAW OF SAFE-DEPOSIT COMPANIES. 139 Where, however, the assistance of the company's officers would not lead to a breach of trust, they may be compelled to give it. For the sheriff to be able to attach the property by taking it into his possession, he must of necessity know whether or not the debtor rents a safe of the company, and, if so, its location. If the officers of the company are satisfied that the writ is regular and the sheriff has a right to demand this information, they may safely give it to him. If they refuse, it may be obtained through an appeal to the court, as was done in the case of Roberts v. The Stuyvesant Safe-Deposit Company. The company having found that it is authorized in giving the sheriff assistance to this extent, it becomes important to know its position in relation to the subsequent acts of the officer. As far as these are concerned, the liability of the com- pany ceases with its verification of the sheriff's authority, and he may then force the door of the safe and take possession of what- ever attachable property it may contain of the debtor, — and even of third persons, where it does not admit of identification or sepa- ration, — without being guilty of trespass himself or in any way involving the company in liability. The extent to which an officer may go, in order to make an attachment of property under a writ lawfully issued, has been clearly defined in cases that apply directly to this subject. In Burton v. Wilkinson (i8 Vt. i86), it was held that the officer may force the door of a warehouse in order to attach property of a defendant, if he be refused admittance by those in charge of the warehouse having the keys. Also, that, if the defendant holds the goods so placed with the warehouseman by a title illegal, the latter may show the lawful seizure in excuse for not delivering them against the true owner as well as against his bailor. Fol- lowing is an interesting extract from the opinion of the court covering the latter holding : — " The wharfinger is the agent of the person of whom he receives the goods, and cannot dispute the title of his principal in an action brought by the principal against him. But this cannot protect the goods thus received from an execution against the person thus depositing them ; and if they are taken from the wharfinger or warehouseman by lawful process, the wharfinger or warehouseman can protect himself in a suit brought against him by the owner. If the person from whom the wharfinger or warehouseman receives the goods claims the same by a title illegal, so that he cannot lawfully hold them, and they are taken by authority of the law out of the custody and care of the wharfinger, the latter may show this in excuse for not delivering them."