Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 9.djvu/224

196 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. have moved the actor in the same direction. I have already shown that the motive of a fire company in pouring water upon a fire is to put out that fire. The law of general average does not, in my opinion, differ in this respect from the law applied in various ways to other sub- jects. The three cases cited by the court to establish a difference do not appear to have that effect. Two of them decide that strangers cannot be forced to contribute, as, for instance, if by cutting a cable the master saves his own ship, and thereby benefits another ship, he cannot claim contribution from the latter because it has no connection with the adventure of ship No. i. ^ It would seem to follow that if strangers are not to contribute for a benefit conferred on them, the intent to benefit them must be wholly immaterial. These two cases seem to favor my view, if they have any bearing at all upon the question. The third case is The Mary. 2 In that case certain goods had been landed at a port of necessity, and were afterwards destroyed by fire. The evidence was that they were so much damaged that they must have been landed in any event ; and also that the exami- nation of the ship would have required them to be landed. Judge Sprague held that the value of the burned goods was not to be brought into the adjustment. No question was made about the extraordinary expense of the unlading itself, and no doubt the adjusters charged this to general average. The decision simply was that the loss could not be considered to have been voluntarily incurred, as it was one which would have occurred in any event. I do not consider that any question of sole motive was present to the mind of the learned judge. At all events, the case does not support the proposition that if the landing of the goods had con- ferred some possible benefit on a stranger, but was otherwise a subject for contribution between the parties to the adventure, that contribution would not have been due. In a case in the House of Lords, ^ where a ship was wrecked on the coast of France, and the shipowner sent an agent from Eng- land, who incurred large expenses in landing and dealing with the cargo, partly for the purpose of saving the freight, and partly for 1 The John Perkins, 3 Ware, 89, and 21 Law Reporter, 87 ; The James P. Donald- son, 19 Fed. Rep. 264. The decision in this case is by Brown, J., who gives the dissenting opinion in Ralli v. Troup. 2 I Sprague, 17. 8 Rosez'. Bank of Australasia (1894), A. C. 687.