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FEDERAL RESTRAINTS. 341 or property is a legislative or administrative rather than a judicial func- tion. Yet it has always been recognized, that, if a carrier attempted to charge a shipper an unreasonable sum, the courts had jurisdiction to inquire into that matter, and to award to the shipper any amount exacted from him in excess of a reasonable rate ; and also in a reverse case to render judgment in favor of the carrier for the amount found to be a rea- sonable charge. The province of the courts is not changed, nor the limit of judicial inquiry altered, because the legislature instead of the carrier prescribes the rates. [But see Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy Railroad Co. V. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155, and Chicago, Milwaukee, & St. Paul Railroad Co. V. Ackley, 94 U. S. 179.] The courts are not authorized to revise or change the body of rates imposed by a legislature or a commis- sion ; they do not determine whether one rate is preferable to another, or what under all circumstances would be fair and reasonable as between the carriers and the shippers ; they do not engage in any mere adminis- trative work ; but still there can be no doubt of their power and duty to inquire whether a body of rates prescribed by a legislature or a commis- sion is unjust and unreasonable, and such as to work a practical destruc- tion to rights of property, and, if found so to be, to restrain its operation." The same principle was also upheld in St. Louis & San Fran- cisco Railway Co. v. G} where the court says: — "This court has declared, in several cases, that there is a remedy in the courts for relief against legislation establishing a tariff of rates which is so unreasonable as to practically destroy the value of property of companies engaged in the carrying business, and that especially may the courts of the United States treat such a question as a judicial one, and hold such acts of legislation to be in conflict with the Constitution of the United States, as depriving the companies of their property without due process of law, and as depriving them of the equal protection of the laws. Railroad Commission Cases, 116 U. S. 307, 331 ; Dow v. Beidel- man, 125 U. S. 681 ; Chicago, Milwaukee, &c. Railway v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418; Chicago & Grand Trunk Railway v. Wellman, 143 U. S. 339; Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362." And it was further decided, that the question of unreasonableness must be determined by the effects of the regulation by the State upon the earnings of the entire line of railroad within the State, as against all its legitimate expenses therein. Secondly, with regard to the provisions of the Constitution relat- ing to impairment of contracts by legislation of a State. In Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy Railroad Co. v. lowa,^ the 1 156 U. S. 649. * 2 94 U. S. 155.