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FEDERAL RESTRAINTS. 343 and subject to all the obligations, as such. It was bound by com- mon law, by its charter, and by the Constitution of Minnesota to carry passengers and freight for a reasonable compensation, but such obligation, the court held, in no wise added to or subtracted from the powers of the State, and the case was placed upon the same ground as the foregoing. Southern Minnesota Railroad Co. V. Coleman ^ was precisely similar. In Stone v. Wisconsin,^ there was a provision in the charter of the railroad company giving the State the right of alteration or repeal; and in this particular the case was like Peik v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co.^ Even if, therefore, the legislature had granted the railroad company power to fix rates of fare and freight, the reserved rights of the State would have enabled it to effect an amendment. In Ruggles v. Illinois,* the charter of the company provided that it should have the power to make such by-laws, rules, and regulations as were deemed necessary, provided that the same were not repugnant to the Constitution and laws of the United States, or the State ; and, further, that the board of directors should have authority to establish such rates of toll as they should from time to time determine advisable by their by-laws. It was here held that the State had not parted with its right of control, inasmuch as a grant thereof was never to be presumed. In Stone v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.,^ the railroad charter conferred upon the incorporators power ** from time to time to fix, regulate, and receive the tolls and charges by them to be received for transportation." The directors were also empowered to make by-laws, rules, and regulations touching the disposition and man- agement of the company's property, and all matters appertaining to its concerns. It did not appear that there was anything here to show a special contract with the State exempting the railroad from State regulation, and therefore the State was held to have retained its ordinary legislative control. The court said : — " Power is granted to fix reasonable charges, but what shall be deemed reasonable in law is nowhere indicated. There is no rate specified, nor any limit set. Notliing whatever is said of the way in which the question of reasonableness is to be settled. All that is left as it was." In Stone v. Illinois Central Railroad Co.,^ the language used in 1 94 U. S. i8i. 3 94 U. S. 164. » 116 U. S. 307. 294U. S. 181. *io8U. 8.526. eii6U. S. 347. 45