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4l8 HARVARD LAW REVIEW. on the part of the United States would seem to be the restrauit of our own citizens from breaches of our neutrality laws. For the purpose of warning our citizens against such breaches a procla- mation like that of President Madison would seem sufficient: " Whereas information has been received that sundry persons, citizens of the United States, are conspiring together to set on foot a military expedition against the dominions of Spain, with which the United States are happily at peace, I have thought fit to issue this my proclamation." If this is enough for the purpose, anything more would be a gratuitous insult to Spain, contrary to our traditions, and opposed to the principles which we insisted upon in our own time of trouble. This is not in any legal sense a recognition of belligerency. My conclusion is confirmed by the action of this government at the time of the last Cuban revolt, twenty-five years ago. That in- surrection lasted ten years, and was apparently more widespread and nearer to success than the present one; but President Grant constantly refused to recognize the insurgents as belligerents. In 1875, eight years after hostilities began, and six years after he had first referred to the insurrection in his annual message. Grant, after defining belligerency and stating when its existence should be recognized, in similar terms to those used above, continued : — " I fail to find in the insurrection the existence of such a substantial political organization, real, palpable, and manifest to the world, having the forms and capable of the ordinary functions of government toward its own people and to other States, with courts for the administration of justice, with a local habitation, possessing such organization of force, such material, such occupation of territory, as to take the contest out of the category of a mere rebellious insurrection, or occasional skirmishes, and place it on the terrible footing of war, to which a recognition of belligerency would aim to elevate it. The contest, moreover, is solely on land ; the insurrection has not possessed itself of a single seaport whence it may send forth its flag, nor has it any means of communication with foreign powers except through the military lines of its adversaries. No apprehension of any of those sudden and difficult complications which a war upon the ocean is apt to precipitate upon the vessels, both commercial and national, and upon the consular officers of other powers, calls for the definition of their relations to the parties to the contest. Considered as a question of expedi- ency, I regard the accordance of belligerent rights still to be as unwise and premature, as I regard it to be, at present, indefensible as a measure of right."! 1 Seventh Annual Message, 1875; i Whart. Dig. Int. Law, 406.