NOTES. 535 stood to be otherwise." This was, of course, a playful exaggeration ; but it is true that the novelty of a proposition did not furnish to his mind a prima facie presumption against its adoption. He not unfrequently ad- vanced theories which, at the time, struck the profession as heretical. But not a few of these heresies ultimately came to be regarded as " orthodox- ies." In more than one instance where he originally stood alone as a dissenter, the entire Court subsequently adopted his views. From the multitude of his opinions it is difficult to select any single one which will give an adequate idea of his power. Some of his most forcible sentences are to be found in that part of the dissenting opinion in Boardman v. Woodman, 47 N. H. 120 (see especially pp. 148 and 150), where he com- bats the prevailing theory that delusion is the legal test of insanity. His strong sense of humor crops out in the opinion in De Lancey v. his. Co., 52 N. H. pp. 587 to 591. A few years ago, when the arguments and in- fluence of the insurance companies seemed certain to defeat a bill pending in the Massachusetts Legislature, a member rose, with " Fifty-second New Hampshire " in his hand, and said that he should like to read to his colleagues the opinion expressed by the Supreme Court of New Hamp- shire relative to insurance companies. Before the reading had progressed far the House was- convulsed with laughter, and there was no effective opposition to the passage of the bill. During Judge Doe's long term of service, a great revolution took place in the legal procedure of the State ; a change which was due to him more than to any other one man (although great credit must also be given to his colleague, the late Chief Justice Bell, who drew up the admirable " Rules for Regulating the Practice in Chancery," 38 N. H. 605-624). Instead of waiting for the legislature to enact a poorly drawn code, the New Hampshire Court proceeded to simplify practice by their decisions ; not merely by discouraging formal objections, but by boldly declaring that " parties are entitled to the most just and convenient procedure that can be invented," and by distinctly recognizing "the judicial duty of allowing a convenient procedure as a necessary instrument of the admin- istration of the law of rights." (See the very able opinions in Metcalf v. Gi/more, 59 N. H. pp. 431 to 435 ; and in Orcen v. Weston, 63 N. H. pp. 600 to 605.) The result is a flexibility of remedies in New Hampshire not surpassed by any of the so-called "Code States." But more than all this was the general tone imparted to legal proceedings by Judge Doe's strong personality. Until his memory is forgotten, cases in New Hamp- shire will be tried expeditiously and upon their merits ; justice will not be
- ' strangled in the net of form " ; and witnesses will not be subjected to
insulting and abusive treatment at the hands of cross-examiners. His mode of living and all his habits were democratic and simple in the ex- treme ; and his love of simplicity led him, when presiding alone at nisi prius, to go far towards abolishing the mere forms and ceremonies which are usually observed in the court-room. But there was no omission of any incident of procedure which was really essential to the rights of suitors. Socially, Judge Doe was one of the most delightful of men. He did not reserve himself for great occasions, but always abounded in good say- ings. Few persons have ever spent an hour in his company without carry- ing away something to remember him by. His intimate friends of many years are now like men " from whose day the light has departed." J. S.
