Page:Harvard Law Review Volume 9.djvu/567

AOTES. 539 cations similar ; the claims of the first patent covered one function of a combination, those of the second patent another function of the same combination. The Supreme Court in an opinion deHvered by Mr. Justice Jackson held that, the entire invention was disclosed by the first patent, and the second patent was void for laci< of novelty. The injustice of a decision which deprives an inventor of the fruits of his genius on account of delay by the Patent Office has been generally recognized. In the case first cited Judge Townsend refused to follow Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co. The patent in suit was the one covering the overhead trolley system of electric railways which has gone into such general use in this country. Tlie inventor filed an application covering the invention broadly, and while this was pending he took out a patent for a special form of trolley. The broad patent granted afterward was attacked for lack of novelty, but the court upheld it. The patents cov- ered different devices so that the precise question of the Miller case did not arise, but the opinion is interesting as showing a tendency to restrict the scope of that decision. A similar decision was reached by Judge Coxe in Tkomsofi- Houston Co. v. E. 6- H. Ry. Co., 69 Fed. Rep. 257, which involved the same patent. In the following cases Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co. was distinguished or cited for a narrow doctrine: Gameivell Co. v. Sigfial Co.y 61 Fed. Rep. 948 ; U. S. V. Bell Tel. Co., 65 Fed. Rep. 86; Reynolds v. Fai?it Co., 68 Fed. Rep. 483 ; Bell Tel. Co. v. U. S., 68 Fed. Rep. 542. The case has been followed only once, in Tassel v. Ewart Mfg. Co., 62 Fed. Rep. 404, where the facts were similar, and there was the additional circum- stance that the inventor attempted by the second patent to prolong his monopoly. On the whole it may be said that the case will be followed only when the foots are similar or when the inventor has not acted in good faith, and that no attempt to extend the scope of the doctrine will be favored by the courts. This view is supported by the opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Thomson- Houston Co. v. E. <5n H. Ry. Co., 7 1 Fed. Rep. 396, on appeal from the decision of Judge Coxe. The court, Wallace, J., at p. 405, says : *' Some observations in Miller v. Mfg. Co. seem to have created some misapprehension of the scope of that decision on the part of the profession, but the principles enunciated in the opinion are so plainly stated that those observations when considered in their applica- tion to the case before the court, ought not to be misconceived. The court decided in that case that the two patents . . . were in fact for the same invention, and consequently the later patent was void." This is the latest expression of opinion on the subject, and, coming from such a high authority, may be taken as conclusive. A Modification of Lawrence v. Fox — Bank Checks. — That in- consistencies are pretty sure to follow when courts adopt a rule funda- mentally wrong in principle is well illustrated by the difficulties which are being experienced by those courts which have adopted the rule of Lawrence v. Fox (20 N. Y. 268), namely, that a promise by A. to B. to meet B.'s debt to C. will support an action by C. against A., although C. was not a party to the contract. Such an action would not have been tolerated by the old common law, but the doctrine has gained a foothold in many of our jurisdictions. (See 8 Harvard Law Review, 93; 9 Har-