| 2. | That all of the authority, which the court that rendered the judgment had, was derived from the Confederate government. |
And assuming these propositions as true, he argues that, inasmuch as the Confederate States failed to sustain her position by force of arms, and was never recognized as an independent government, this court cannot decide upon the question, but must be governed by the action of the national government. And to sustain this latter position, he has referred to several authorities of deserved weight, which very fully sustain his position as between this government and foreign governments; but after due consideration, we are satisfied that the question, as to whether the late Confederate States government was, or was not a foreign government, is not properly before us. We are aware that cases may, and probably will soon arise, where this will properly come before us for consideration; until which time, we will enter into no consideration of it.
The question before us is, not with regard to the relations existing between the Confederate States and the United States, but whether the state of Arkansas, after the ordinance of secession, maintained her state government, either de jure or de facto. The learned counsel, in our opinion, was mistaken in supposing the courts of Arkansas derived any power, or authority to adjudicate, from the Confederate States government, or from the United States government. The power of the court was derived, directly, from the constitution and laws of the state government of Arkansas, whose power as to its municipal government, as we have seen, is independent of any other government, whether confederate or federal. The fact that she chose, in her sovereign capacity, to act with the Confederate States, (even conceding that she had the power to disconnect herself from the United States government, which we have seen she had not), in no wise affected her rights, or power as a state. And so far as the recognition of the state government is concerned, we are sustained by very high authority in saying, that no recognition was necessary; and we may further safely assume that, if it was, there is
