The words, "all the action of the state," in the second clause of the ordinance, should receive a like limited meaning, because if all the action of the state, legislative, executive, judicial, and military, without limitation, should be held void ab initio the proviso, which declares that the "rights of individuals" are excepted, can have no effect; because it is utterly inconsistent, to declare all void, and still that a part shall be preserved. Nor will it do to say that the rights of individuals, not to be affected, are such as did not arise out of or depend upon state action; because as no rights were declared void, except those arising out of state action, no proviso was necessary to preserve them—any other rights would not, in any event have been affected.
But by construing the words, "all the action of the state," to mean all of the action of the state, under the constitution of 1861, which is in conflict with the constitution of the United States, shall be void, the rights of individuals as contradistinguished from the rights of the government, would be preserved. The words, "individual rights," clearly point to a class of rights distinct from those which belong to government, and favor the construction which limits the meaning of the words, "entire," and "all," in their several connections.
By thus giving to these words a limited meaning, in harmony with the leading purpose for which the convention of 1864 was called together, we are aware that there are words and sentences in the ordinance, which would be surperfluous; but by leaving these as superfluous and unnecessary, we may preserve and give effect to the ordinance, according to what appears to us to have been the obvious intention of the framers of the constitution, and can thus best avoid the most absurd and disastrous consequences. Owing to the peculiar wording of the ordinance, an attempt in any other way, to reconcile and bring in harmony its several parts would but lead to like results.
Thus, if we give to the word "entire," an unqualified meaning, the constitution of 1861 must be treated as a nullity—void from its inception. That which is absolutely void, is in law nothing.
