Page:Health and Hospital Corp. of Marion Co. v. Talevski.pdf/14

This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.

10

HEALTH AND HOSPITAL CORPORATION OF MARION CTY. v. TALEVSKI

Opinion of the Court

maintain assumpsit on a promise not under seal, made to another for his benefit, … is now the prevailing rule in this country”).^[1] “[S]omething more than ‘ambiguous historical evidence’ is required before we will ‘flatly overrule a number of major decisions of this Court,’ ” Gamble v. United States, 587 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 11), as HHC essentially asks us to do here.

Second, because “[t]here is no doubt that the cause of action created by §1983 is, and was always regarded as, a tort claim,” Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U. S. 687, 727 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment), HHC’s particular focus on 1870s law governing third-party-beneficiary suits in contract is, at the very least, perplexing. If there is a reason that the principles governing those suits should be read to displace the plain scope of §1983’s “ ‘species of tort liability,’ ” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477, 483 (1994), HHC has utterly failed to identify it.

We have no doubt that HHC wishes §1983 said something else. But that is “an appeal better directed to Congress.” Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U. S. ___, ___ (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (slip op., at 2). Hewing to §1983’s text and history (not to mention our precedent and constitutional role), we reject HHC’s request, and reaffirm that “laws” in §1983 means what it says. Thiboutot, 448 U. S., at 4.^[2]

↑ Black’s Law Dictionary 154 (11th ed. 2019) (defining assumpsit, as relevant, as a “common-law action for … breach of a contract”).
↑ HHC’s reply brief retreats from its initial ask, by appearing to concede that Spending Clause legislation can secure individual rights under §1983, but (it says) only if the statutory language “giv[es] funding recipients clear notice.” Reply Brief 1. This newly minted argument contradicts the opening brief’s categorical claims about the scope of §1983. In any event, the well-established requirement that Congress must have “unambiguously conferred” a §1983-enforceable right in a Spending Clause statute ensures the clear notice that HHC’s reply brief requests. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U. S. 273, 279–280, 283 (2002); Part III, infra.

[1] Black’s Law Dictionary 154 (11th ed. 2019) (defining assumpsit, as relevant, as a “common-law action for … breach of a contract”).

[2] HHC’s reply brief retreats from its initial ask, by appearing to concede that Spending Clause legislation can secure individual rights under §1983, but (it says) only if the statutory language “giv[es] funding recipients clear notice.” Reply Brief 1. This newly minted argument contradicts the opening brief’s categorical claims about the scope of §1983. In any event, the well-established requirement that Congress must have “unambiguously conferred” a §1983-enforceable right in a Spending Clause statute ensures the clear notice that HHC’s reply brief requests. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U. S. 273, 279–280, 283 (2002); Part III, infra.

[1]

[2]