United States v. Ta-wan-ga-ca.
November, 1836.—Indictment for murder, in the District Court, before Hon. Benjamin Johnson, district judge.
Chester Ashley, district attorney pro tem., for United States.
William Cummins and Samuel S. Hall, for the prisoner.
OPINION OF THE COURT.—The prisoner was indicted for murder at a term of the superior court of the late Territory of Arkansas. That court was competent to try him for the crime, as a law of the United States had conferred upon it jurisdiction of capital crimes committed in that part of the Indian country west of Arkansas. The superior court of the territory ceased to exist, and no trial in this case was had. The district attorney pro tempore now moves the court to commit the prisoner to jail, and produces, as evidence of the commission of the crime sufficient to authorize the committal asked for, the original indictment found against the prisoner in the superior court of the territory. The first question which arises is, whether this court has jurisdiction of the offence.
The act of congress, establishing the Arkansas district court, gives it "the same powers that by law are given to the Kentucky district court by an act establishing the judicial courts of the United States." The act referred to was passed in 1789 (1 Story, Laws U.S. 53), and gave to the Kentucky district court no power to hear, try, or determine any matter arising beyond the limits of the State of Kentucky. All the laws giving to the circuit and district courts of the United States jurisdiction of crimes committed in the Indian country, have been passed subsequent to 1789. The courts of the United States are courts of limited, though not of inferior jurisdiction (10 Wheat. 192), and they can take no jurisdiction and possess no powers, except such as are expressly given by acts of congress, or are necessarily implied therefrom. The law establishing this court refers expressly to the law of 1789, and gives to this court all the powers which by that law were given the Kentucky court. This court, in defining its own powers and limiting its own jurisdiction, has no other guide than the law of 1789. Congress has conferred upon it no other powers, and a jurisdiction no more extended, than by that act were given to the Kenttucky court. The special grant of particular powers in this
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