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DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS.
347

Winter et al. v. United States.


Villemont, the then Spanish commandant of the post, in 1798, as the south-east corner of the tract granted to Elisha Winter, and as the south-west corner of the tract granted to William Winter. The place pointed out to me, as that where William Winter settled and lived and died, was north of east of the corner-stone, and one mile and a half from it.

The grant to William Winter was generally understood, and reputed at the post of Arkansas, in 1812 or 1813, to lie east of that granted to Elisha Winter; that the lines of these tracts were to be run to the cardinal points, and that the line dividing them was to be run north from this corner-stone.

He has heard the said Don Carlos de Villemont say, that the stone was planted with a good deal of public ceremony for the purpose of putting the grantees in possession of their lands.

As to these matters he has no personal knowledge, and what he does know and states is derived from hearsay and reputation. In 1816 or 1817, he was at the said corner-stone, which had then fallen down and was lying on the ground; but it was generally said to be at the same spot where it was first set, in 1798.

To this deposition the United States, by S. H. Hempstead, district attorney, excepted on the ground that it was formed of "matters of hearsay and reputation as to particular facts, and therefore inadmissible."

An exception was also taken to the statement of Don Carlos de Villemont, made before Frederick Bates in 1813, on the ground that the latter had no authority to take it.

These exceptions having been argued by Daniel Ringo, for the petitioners, and S. H. Hempstead, district attorney, for the United States, the court, on the 7th of September, 1846, delivered the following opinion:—

OPINION OF THE COURT.—The first exception is to the second deposition of William Russell.

It is not deemed necessary to notice any other ground of exception to this deposition than the one which relates to hearsay and reputation.

The court heretofore ruled in this case, that hearsay and reputation was not admissible to prove particular facts in a