Page:Hillsborough Taylor Interim Report Cm765.pdf/49

CHAPTER 12
THE BARRIERS IN PEN 3

Barrier 144

233. The removal of barrier 144 in 1986 should have reduced the notional capacity of pen 3 as already mentioned. But it did more. In the absence of barrier 144, the influx of fans after 2.52 pm met no retarding structure as it came into pen 3. The pressure created was free to push fans straight down by the radial fence to the lowest line of barriers. The pressure diagonally from the tunnel mouth down to barrier number 124a which collapsed was unbroken by any intervening barrier. 124a was also vulnerable to pressure straight down the pen through the gap in the barrier above it created in 1985.

234. Inspector Bullas, positioned in the west stand, described what he saw looking down on the pens around 3 pm.

"... I saw from the direction of the tunnel a kind of movement down the terracing... the type of thing that you see on the nature programmes, the molten lead flowing down the side of the mountainside, the molten lava... a "river of people" ... going directly towards the pitch but there again spreading... out."

235. Dr Eastwood conceded in evidence that the removal of barrier 144 was likely to have contributed to the collapse of 124a. Later, he sought to resile from that answer, but I think his earlier admission was correct. It was argued that if barrier 144 had remained, the influx from gate C would have built up further back and the tragedy might have occurred in the tunnel or might have broken barrier 144 itself. This is speculative and I think unlikely. What remained of barrier 144 in pen 4 did not cause a build-up; nor did it collapse. But its remaining in position may well have accounted for no barrier further down pen 4 collapsing and for the lesser carnage in that pen.

When did Barrier 124a Fail?

236. Counsel for the South Yorkshire Police sought to argue that this barrier collapsed or may have collapsed at about 2.47 pm. His purpose was to suggest that the opening of gate C was not causally linked with the crushing and fatalities resulting from that collapse. I have already found that whilst the evidence does not permit the time of collapse to be fixed with certainty, it was after 2.52 pm. I now give my reasons:

(a)

I have several times watched the BBC video tape on which Counsel relied. I do not find the incident he identifies at 2.47 pm suggestive of a collapse at that time;

(b)

the evidence of fans who were near or at the barrier was overwhelmingly to the effect that the collapse occurred at or after 3 pm;

(c)

the biggest group of witnesses was that which related the collapse to the surge following Beardsley's

"near-miss" at the Kop end at 3.04 pm;

(d)

the appearance on video and photographs of fans in the area of barrier 124a after the incident at 2.47 pm and before the final crush is not consistent with it having collapsed so early;

(e)

it is highly unlikely that if so catastrophic an event had occurred as early as 2.47 pm, the police on the track and elsewhere would have taken until nearly 3 o'clock to realise something was seriously wrong. Indeed, if Counsel for the South Yorkshire Police were correct in his timing of the collapse, the failure of the police to respond for so long would expose them to even graver criticism than that made in this Report.

Dr Eastwood's Testing of the Barriers

237. Two sections of barrier 124a in pen 3 collapsed as a result of the overcrowding. That collapse caused a number of deaths. Dr Eastwood and his staff had undertaken the periodical testing of crush barriers required by the Green Guide and by the Safety Certificate. Barrier 124a had been tested in July 1988 and passed.

238. The test had been carried out in accordance with Dr Eastwood's interpretation of Annex C to the Green Guide. That requires an evenly distributed force of 6.0kN/metre width to be applied for 3 five minute