CHAPTER 14
THE RESPONSE OF THE POLICE
The Officers in Command
250. Even when realisation of the problem came to officers on the track, it was some minutes before it reached the control room. When spectators first appeared on the track, the immediate assumption in the control room was that a pitch invasion was threatened. This was unlikely at the beginning of a match. It became still less likely when those on the track made no move towards the pitch. Mr Motson, the BBC commentator, recognised and said, well before the match was stopped, that the trouble seemed to be overcrowding and not misbehaviour. Still, the assumption to the contrary persisted in the control room. Until Mr Murray radioed for a fleet of ambulances, about 3.06 pm, Mr Duckenfield continued to treat the incident as a threat to the pitch and to public order. The message calling up all available officers mentioned a pitch invasion. Operation Support was initiated and dog handlers were requested.
251. Until Chief Superintendent Nesbit arrived, there was no effective leadership either from control or on the pitch to harness and organise rescue efforts. No orders were given for officers to enter the tunnel and relieve pressure. Some officers did this on their own initiative. Apart from the Tannoy request to clear the pitch, no attempt was made to clear and mark off a casualty area where first-aid could be given without hindrance by fans and photographers milling about between the bodies. There was no co-ordination of the early provision of first-aid or of stretcher parties or of the rescue effort through gates 3 and 4. No request for help was broadcast to doctors and nurses in the crowd until about 3.29 pm when it was too late. Probably, there was little that could have been achieved in most cases however soon doctors had been summoned, but there were marginal cases where earlier attention might have made a difference.
252. The plight of those behind the fencing and the existence of injuries were known to officers at the scene from 3 pm. But the Major Disaster Plan was not started until 3.06 pm at earliest when the ambulance service was called. No request for cutting gear or for the fire brigade was made until 3.13 p.m. Again, it is unlikely that these services could have saved lives if they had been called promptly, but it is possible.
Police on the Pitch
253. Despite the initial lack of leadership, many officers did all they humanly could to rescue and revive the victims. Many supporters who gave evidence paid tribute to these efforts. It is also fair to say that the number of officers who could at first be usefully involved at the two open gates was necessarily limited.
254. Chief Superintendent Nesbit's action in deploying a line of officers across the middle of the pitch has already been mentioned. I can well understand the resentment it caused. However, the police assertion that a rush by some fans towards the Kop end raised fears of conflict are well borne out by the video tape. In my judgement, Chief Superintendent Nesbit was well justified in using some of the many officers called up pursuant to Operation Support to prevent possible violence. To have had open fighting in a ground where some 90 spectators already lay dead would have been an unthinkable and obscene development.
Fans on the Pitch
255. Many fans who escaped onto the pitch alive were in a state of collapse or close to it. Most of those who retained their strength strove magnificently to assist the victims. They helped pull them clear; they helped with first-aid; they helped carry the improvised stretchers.
256. There were fans, however, who were distraught, angry, drunk, or all three. Their conduct in abusing, assaulting and spitting at the police was disgraceful, the more so since earlier police failures had little to do with those officers now doing their best for the injured. In addition, there were abuse and assaults on ambulance men and firemen in the course of their rescue work. This was. probably because their similar uniforms caused them to be mistaken for police. However, although the abuse was widespread, the number of assaults and spittings was on the evidence comparatively small. In deploring them, one must recognise the uniquely horrifying experience which those responsible had just suffered and were still suffering.
False Reports
257. Before this Inquiry began, there were stories reported in the press, and said to have emanated from police officers present at the match, of "mass drunkenness". It was said that drunken fans urinated on the police while they were pulling the dead and injured out, that others had even urinated on the bodies of the dead and stolen their belongings. Not a single witness was called before the Inquiry to support any of those allegations although every opportunity was afforded for any of the represented parties to have any witness called whom they wished. As soon as the allegations I have mentioned were made in the press, Mr Peter Wright, Chief Constable of South Yorkshire, made a dignified statement dissociating himself from such grave and emotive calumnies. Those who made them, and those who disseminated them, would have done better to hold their peace.
