281. Mr Duckenfield leant heavily on Mr Murray's experience. Between them they misjudged the build-up at the turnstiles and did little about it until they received Mr Marshall's request to open the gate. They did not, for example, check the turnstile figures available from Club control or check with Tango units as to the numbers still to come. They did not alert Mr Greenwood to the situation at the fringe of his area of command. They gave no instructions as to the management of the crowd at Leppings Lane. Inflexibly they declined to postpone kick-off.
282. When Mr Marshall's request came, Mr Duckenfield's capacity to take decisions and give orders seemed to collapse. Having sanctioned, at last, the opening of the gates, he failed to give necessary consequential orders or to exert any control when the disaster occurred. He misinterpreted the emergence of fans from pens 3 and 4. When he was unsure of the problem, he sent others down to "assess the situation" rather than descend to see for himself. He gave no information to the crowd.
283. Most surprisingly, he gave Mr Kelly and others to think that there had been an inrush due to Liverpool fans forcing open a gate. This was not only untruthful. It set off a widely reported allegation against the supporters which caused grave offence and distress. It revived against football fans, and especially those from Liverpool, accusations of hooliganism which caused reaction not only nationwide but from Europe too. I can only assume that Mr Duckenfield's lack of candour on this occasion was out of character. He said his reason fornot telling the truth was that if the crowd became aware of it there might be a very hostile reaction and this might impede rescue work. He did not wish to divulge what had happened until he had spoken to a senior officer. However, reluctance to tell Mr Kelly the truth did not require that he be told a falsehood. Moreover, although Assistant Chief Constable Jackson was at hand, Mr Duckenfield did not disclose the truth to him until much later.
284. The likeliest explanation of Mr Duckenfield's conduct is that he simply could not face the enormity of the decision to open the gates and all that flowed therefrom. That would explain what he said to Mr Kelly, what he did not say to Mr Jackson, his aversion to addressing the crowd and his failure to take effective control of the disaster situation. He froze.
The Police Case at the Inquiry
285. It is a matter of regret that at the hearing, and in their submissions, the South Yorkshire Police were not prepared to concede they were in any respect at fault in what occurred. Mr Duckenfield, under pressure of cross-examination, apologised for blaming the Liverpool fans for causing the deaths. But, that apart, the police case was to blame the fans for being late and drunk, and to blame the Club for failing to monitor the pens. It was argued that the fatal crush was not caused by the influx through gate C but was due to barrier 124a being defective. Such an unrealistic approach gives cause for anxiety as to whether lessons have been learnt. It would have been more seemly and encouraging for the future if responsibility had been faced.
