ance of the siege, caused the liveliest discontent among the imperial troops, who, longing for rest and retirement after their prolonged and arduous campaigning, gave vent to their disappointment in complaints both loud and bitter.
On the nineteenth of Sha'ban the miners reported that the mines were ready to be exploded. It was accordingly ordered that the besiegers should man the trenches, advancing as close as possible to the walls, and should then utter loud shouts, in order to attract the garrison to the walls. The shouts had the desired effect, but Abdur Razzaq Lari guessed their object. He accordingly ordered countermines to be sunk as rapidly as possible. His operations were successful, and his miners abstracted from one mine both match and powder, and damaged the charges of the other two mines with water. Ignorant of the damage that had been done the besiegers fired one of the mines in preparation for an attempt to take the place by storm. But the powder in the direction of the fort was wet, and the mine consequently exploded in the wrong direction, killing over a thousand of the imperial troops, among whom were many officers of high rank. A scene of indescribable consternation and confusion ensued, and the garrison, seizing their opportunity, sallied forth and attacked the besiegers, capturing the trenches. After an obstinate fight the trenches were recaptured with much loss, but they were barely re-occupied when a second mine was fired, the effects of which were even more disastrous than those of the first. By the explosion itself and the stones which it threw up about two thousand of the imperial army were killed and wounded, and the explosion was followed up by the besieged with a second sortie, even more determined than the first. They were met by the Mughal commander, Ghazi-ud-din Khan, Firuz Jang, who was driven back with a loss of nearly three hundred and fifty men. So critical was the position of the imperial troops at this juncture that the emperor himself found it necessary to come to their relief with the reserves. As he advanced to the attack a heavy storm came on, the nalas filled rapidly, and the rain fell with such violence that it was impossible for the troops to manoeuvre, and Aurangzib himself was repulsed. The principal battery was completely washed away, and the Deccanis, seeing the demoralisation of their assailants, poured forth from the
