ity to restore order, the governor set out with Alférez Pliego and ten or twenty men, leaving Zamorano, his secretary, in command at Monterey. Even on arriving at Santa Bárbara he seems to have got no definite information of the San Diego movement; but he was with some difficulty persuaded by Guerra to increase his little force before going to Los Angeles, and was accordingly joined by Captain Romualdo Pacheco and about a dozen soldiers.[1] His entire force was now not over thirty men, nearly all I suppose of the San Blas and Mazatlan companies. He expected no fight; but in case trouble should arise, he doubtless counted on the aid of Portilla and his Mazatecos. Before he reached San Fernando, however, messengers overtook him from Santa Bárbara with definite news of the open revolt at San Diego, in letters from the rebel leaders to the Carrillo brothers, which by advice of Guerra they had forwarded to put him on his guard.[2] At San Fernando on December 4th, Padre Ibarra had not heard of the revolt at San Diego, and a messenger sent in haste to the pueblo brought back word from Alcalde Sanchez that at sunset there were no signs of revolution. Later in the evening, however, when the revolutionists arrived from the south, releasing the prisoners and locking up Sanchez, a brother of the latter is said to have escaped with the news to San Fernando. And thus next morning the hostile armies marched out from the
- ↑ The widow Ávila, Cosas de Cal., MS, 29-30, states that provisions were prepared at her house for Victoria's march, and that he left Monterey at dawn with about 15 men. Gonzalez, Experiencias, MS., 29-30, and Ord, Ocurrencias, MS., 48-9, speak from memory of Victoria's arrival at Sta Bárbara. The latter says Guerra warned Pacheco to be careful. 'Cuidado! que aquellos son tercos; allí está José Antonio Carrillo.' Spence says Victoria took 10 men from Monterey; Robinson, that he reached Sta Bárbara with 20.
- ↑ Pico, Hist. Cal., MS., 35-40. Pico's narrative of the whole affair is remarkably accurate in every case where its accuracy can be tested, and is therefore worthy of some credit where no such test is possible.
that the captain was put in command on the march to Los Angeles mainly that he might be watched. Several Californians state that it was only by the vigilance and threats of José Antonio Carrillo that Portilla was kept from going over to the foe at the last. A contemptible weakness, rather than deliberate treachery, was Portilla's fault; besides, as we shall see, the valiant commander and his men did no fighting when the hour of battle arrived.
