empty: should the Emperor die, as was not unlikely, England would be left again to fight the battle alone. The German Protestants would be offended, and France, after all, might not have the intentions which were attributed to her. It might be possible so to help the Emperor as to induce the Protestant princes to unite also; to make the Turks the ground of quarrel, and to declare France an enemy of Christendom. A war on such terms would be inexpensive, and England would be strengthened by taking part in a general league. On the other hand, such a league could not be formed either rapidly or secretly; and if the attempt should be made, and fail, France would be inexpiably offended.
The ultimate resolution was to reply with a general assurance of sympathy; to offer active assistance against the Turks, and so to feel the way towards a larger combination. The Lutheran powers, having secured their own liberties, were known to be looking suspiciously on the French movements. If the Emperor would consent to act with them, England might then go further. Meantime she would recruit her finances, and prepare for all contingencies.[1]
Charles was unable to quarrel with so meagre an answer. He had deserved no better; nor could Eng-
- ↑ Edward's Journal, September, 1552.—Discussion on the War with France, with the Instructions to Sir Richard Morryson: Cotton. MSS. Galba, 12.
dèle, ce qu'il disoit estre notoire par ce que le don de faire miracles luy estoit ostée; disant que ses prédécesseurs Roys d'Angleterre avoient de cousturae de guérir du mal caduc, mais que ceste vertu luy avoit este ostée, et n'en guérissoit, plus à cause de son infidélité.'—MS. France, Edward VI. bundle 10, State Paper Office.
