RETREAT OF THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS. 51 "We may however remark that Hellas, as a whole, had no cause to regret the fall of Cyrus at Kunaxa. Had he dethroned his brother and become king, the Persian empire would have acquired under his hand such a degree of strength as might probably have enabled him to forestall the work afterwards performed by the Macedonian kings, and to make the Greeks in Europe as well as those in Asia his dependents. He would have employed Grecian military organization against Grecian independence, as Philip and Alexander did after him. His money would have enabled him to hire an overwhelming force of Grecian officers and soldiers, who would (to use the expression of Proxenus as recorded by Xeno- phon 1 ) have thought him a better friend to them than their own country. It would have enabled him also to take advantage of dis- sension and venality in the interior of each Grecian city, and thus to weaken their means of defence while he strengthened his own means of attack. This was a policy which none of the Persian kings, from Da'rius son of Hystaspes down to Darius Codomanus, had ability or perseverance enough to follow out ; none of them knew either the true value of Grecian instruments, or how to em- ploy them with effect. The whole conduct of Cyrus, in reference to this memorable expedition, manifests a superior intelligence, competent to use the resources which victory would have put in his hands, and an ambition likely to use them against the Greeks, in avenging the humiliations of Marathon, Salamis, and the peace of Kallias. This tragical scene (on the night of the 23d of March, 1369) is graphi- cally described by M. Me'rime'e (p. 564-566). 1 Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 4. 'Tjrtcr^vetro (Je airy (Sew^wvra Upo^evof) el eA-
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