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242 HISTORY OF GREECE. ter of the Athenians — improvers, to a certain extent, of military operations on land, but the great creators of marine tactics and manoeuvring in Greece, — and the earliest of all Greeks who showed themselves capable of organizing and directing the joint action of numerous allies and dependents, — thus uniting the tw9 distinctive qualities of the Homeric Agamemnon,' — ability is command, Vvith vigor in esecution. In the general Hellenic confederacy, which had acted against Persia under the presidency of Sparta, Athens could hardly be said to occupy any ostensible rank above that of an ordinary member : the post of second dignity in the line at Platsea had indeed been adjudged to her, but only after a contending claim from Tegea. But without any difference in ostensible rank, she was in the eye and feeling of Greece no longer the same power as before. She had suffered more, and at sea had certainly done more, than all the other allies put together : even on land at Platsa, her hoplites had manifested a combination of bravery, discipline, and efficiency against the formidable Persian cavalrj superior even to the Spartans : nor had any Athenian officer committed so perilous an act of disobedience as the Spartan Amompharetus. After the victory of Mykale, when the Pelo^- ponnesians all hastened home to enjoy their triumph, the Athe- nian forces did not shrink from prolonged service foi* the impor- tant object of clearing the Hellespont, thus standing forth as the willing and forward champions of the Asiatic Greeks against Persia. Besides these exploits of Athens collectively, the only two individuals gifted with any talents for command, whom thia ■momentous conquest had thrown up, were both of them Athe- nians : first, Themistokles ; next, Aristeides. From the beginning to the end of the struggle, Athena had displayed an unreserved Pan-Hellenic patriotism, which had been most ungenerously requited by the Peloponnesians ; who had kept within their isth- mian walls, and betrayed Attica twice to hostile ravage ; the first time, perhaps, unavoidably, — but the second time a culpable neglect, in postponing their outward march against Mardonius. And the Peloponnesians could not but feel, that while they had ^ 'Au(p6T€pov, iSaai/.n'x r' uya&dc, Kparepoq r' alxfir/TTJC- Homer, Iliad, iii, 179.