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CHANGES AT ATHENS UNDER PERIKLES. 899 «very kind, addressed to the dikasteries.i Of course, such arti- ' To a person accustomed to the judicature of modern Europe, conducted throughout all its stages by the instrumentality of professional men,— judges, advocates, attorneys, etc., — and viewed by the general public as a matter in which no private citizen either could act or ought to act for him- self, — nothing is more remarkable in reading the Attic judicial orations, to a certain extent also the Roman, than the entire absence of this pro fessional feeling, and the exhibition of justice both invoked and adminis tered by private citizens exclusively. The nearest analogy to this, which modern justice presents, is to be found in the courts of Requests and other courts for trjing causes limited to small sums of property, — too small to be worth the notice of jiidges and lawyers. These courts, in spite of their direct and important bearing on the wel- fare and security of the poorer classes, have received little elucidation. The History of the Birmingham Court of Requests, by Mr. "William Hutton, — lately republished by Messrs. Chambers, — forms an exception to this remark, and is full of instruction in respect to the habits, the conduct, and the sufteriug-s of poor persons. It furnishes, besides, the closest ap proach that I know to the feelings of Athenian dikasts and pleaders, though of course with many important differences. Mr. Hutton was for many years unremitting in his attendance as a commissioner, and took warm interest in the honorable working of the court. His remarks upon tiie position, the duties, and the difficulties of the commissioners, illus- trated by numerous cases given in detail, are extremely interesting, and represent thoughts which must have often suggested themselves to intelli- gent dikasts at Athens. "Law and equity (he says, p. 34) often vaiy. If the commissionei's can- not decide against law, they can decide without it. Their oath binds them to proceed according to good conscience (Ttepl otov ovk elat vouoi, yvujiri r^ SiKaiorarr), was the oath of the Athenian dikast). A man only needs information to be able to decide."' A few words from p. 36, about the sources of misjudgment. '• Misinfor- mation is another source of evil : both parties equally treat the commis- sioners with deceit. The only people who can throw light upon the subject will not. '• It is difficult not to be won by the first speaker, if he carries the air of mildness and is master of his tale ; or not to be biased in favor of infir- mity or infancy. Those who cannot assist themselves, we are much inclined to assist. . " Nothing dissolves like tears. Though they arise from weakness, they are powerful advocates, which instantly disann, particularly those which the aflBicted wish to hide. They come from the heart and will reach it, if the judge has a heart to reach. Distress and pity are inseparable. '■ Perhaps there never was a judge, from seventeen to seventy, who could look with indifference upon beauty in distress ; if he could, he was unfit to