This page needs to be proofread.
284
284

284 HISTORY OF GREECE. which the accusatory eloquence of the demagogue was called for, to expose the real past mismanagement of Nikias, to break down that undeserved confidence in his ability and cautfon which had grown into a sentiment of faith or routine, to prove how much mischief he had already done, and how much more he would do if continued. 1 Unluckily for Athens, she had now no demagogue who could convince the assembly beforehand of this truth, and prevent them from taking the most unwise and de- structive resolution ever passed in the Pnyx. What makes the resolution so peculiarly discreditable, is, that it was adopted in defiance of clear and present evidence. To persfst in the siege of Syracuse, under present circumstances, was sad misjudgment ; to persist in it with Nikias as commander, was hardly less than insanity. The first expedition, though even that was rash and ill-conceived, nevertheless presented tempting hopes which explain, if they do not excuse, the too light estimate of impossibility of lasting possession. Moreover, there was at that time a confusion, between the narrow objects connected with Leontini and Egesta, and the larger acquisitions to be realized through the siege of Syracuse, which prevented any clear and unanimous estimate of the undertaking in the Athenian mind. But now, the circumstances of Sicily were fully known : the mendacious promises of Egesta had been exposed ; the hopes of allies for Athens in the island were seen to be futile ; while Syracuse, armed with a Spartan general and Peloponnesian aid, had not only become inexpugnable, but had assumed the aggres- sive : lastly, the chance of a renewal of Peloponnesian hostility against Attica had been now raised into certainty. While perse- verance in the siege of Syracuse, therefore, under circumstances so unpromising and under such necessity for increased exertions at home, was a melancholy imprudence in itself, perseverance in employing Nikias converted that imprudence into ruin, which even the addition of an energetic colleague in the person of 1 Plutarch (Nikias. c. 20) tells us that the Athenians had been disposed to send a second armament to Sicily, even before the despatch of Nikias reached them : but that they had been prevented by certain men who were envious ($&6vu) of the glory and good fortune of Nikias. No judgment can be more inconsistent with the facts of the case that

thia, facts recounted in general terms even by Plutarch himself.