Page:History of Greece Vol VIII.djvu/406

34 HISTORY OF GREECE. comfort consists in establishing laws to restrain this strong man, reinforced by a moral sanction of praise and blame devoted to the same general end. They catch him, like a young lion, whilst his mind is yet tender, and fascinate him by talk and training into a disposition conformable to that measure and equality which the law enjoins. Here, then, is justice according to the law of society ; a factitious system, built up by the many for their own protection and happiness, to the subversion of the law of nature, which arms the strong man with a right to encroachment and license. Let a fair opportunity occur, and the favorite of Nature will be seen to kick off his harness, tread down the laws, break through the magic circle of opinion around him, and stand forth again as lord and master of the many ; regaining that gloriou? position which nature has assigned to him as his right. Justice by nature, and justice by law and society, are thus, according -to Kallikles, not only distinct, but mutually contradictory. He ac cuses Sokrates of having jumbled the two together in his argu- ment. 1 It has been contended by many authors that this anti-socia reasoning true enough, in so far as it states simple 2 matter of fact and probability ; immoral, in so far as it erects the power of the strong man into a right ; and inviting many comments, if I could find a convenient place for them represents the morality commonly and publicly taught by the persons called sophists al Athens. 3 I deny this assertion emphatically. Even if I had nc 1 This doctrine asserted by Kallikles will be found in Plato, Gorgias, c 39. 40, pp. 483, 484. 2 See the same matter of fact strongly stated by Sokrates in the Memo rab. of Xenophon, ii, 1, 13. 3 Schleiermacher (in the Prolegomena to his translation of the Theae- tetus, p. 183) represents that Plato intended to refute Aristippus in the person of Kallikles ; which supposition he sustains, by remarking that Aristippus affirmed that there was no such thing as justice by nature, but only by law and convention. But the affirmation of Kallikles is the direct contrary of that which Schleiermacher ascribes to Aristippus. Kalliklea not only does not deny justice by nature, but affirms it in the most direct manner, explains what it is, that it consists in the right of the strongest man to make use of his strength without any regard to others, and puts It above the justice of law and society, in respect to authority. Bitter and Brandis are yet m^re incorrect in their accusations of the