Page:History of Modern Philosophy (Falckenberg).djvu/147

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i^- SPINOZA: SUBSTANCE, ATTRIBUTES, MODES. 125 the ground of his existence ; God's power and his essence coincide (I./r^/. 34: Dei potentia est ipsa ipsius sssentia). He is the cause of himself {def. prima : per causani siii intelligo id, ciijus esse?itia involvit existentiam, sive id, cujiis natura non potest concipi nisi existetis) ; it would be a con- tradiction to hold that being was not, that God, or sub- stance, did not exist ; he cannot be thought otherwise than v as existing; his concept includes his existence. To be self-caused means to exist necessarily (I. prop. 7). The same thing is denoted by the predicate eternal, which, according to the eighth definition, denotes " existence itself, in so far as it is conceived to follow necessarily from the mere definition of the eternal thing." The infinite substance stands related to finite, individual / things, not only as the independent to the dependent, as | the cause to the caused, as the one to the many, and the whole to the parts, but also as the universal to the particular, 1 the indeterminate to the determinate. From infinite being as pure affirmation {J. prop. 8, schol. i : absoluta affirmation everything which contains a limitation or negation, and this includes every particular determination, must be kept at a distance : determinatio negatio est {Epist. 50 and 41 : a deter- mination denotes nothing positive, but a deprivation, a lack of existence ; relates not to the being but to the non-being of the thing). A determination states that which dis-l tinguishes one thing from another, hence what it is 7iot,^ expresses a limitation of it. Consequently God, who is free from every negation and limitation, is to be conceived as the absolutely indeterminate. The results thus far f reached run : Substantia una infinita — Deus sive natura — causa sui {externa) et rerum {jmmaneyis) — libera necessitas — non determinata. Or more briefly : Substance = God =- ^ nature. The equation of God and substance had been announced by Descartes, but not adhered to, while Bruno had approached the equation of God and nature — Spinoza decisively completes both and combines them. A further remark may be added concerning the relation of God and the world. In calling the infinite at once the permanent essence of things and their producing cause, Spinoza raises a demand which it is not easy to fulfill,