Page:History of Modern Philosophy (Falckenberg).djvu/185

THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. 163 ducing motion. This latter is termed " will." Here Locke discusses at length the freedom of the will, but not with entire clearness and freedom from contradictions (cf. below, p. 177). Modes are conditions which do not subsist of themselves, but have need of a basis or support ; they are not conceiv- able apart from a thing whose properties or states they are. We notice that certain qualities always appear together, and habitually refer them to a substratum as the ground of their unity, in which they subsist or from which they pro- ceed. Substajice denotes this self-existent "we know not what," which has or bears the attributes in itself, and which arouses the ideas of them in us. It is the combination of a number of simple ideas which are presumed to belong to one thing. From the ideas of sensation the understanding composes the idea of body, and from the ideas of reflection that of mind. Each of these is just as clear and just as obscure as the other ; of each we know only its effects and its sensuous properties ; its essence is for us entirely unknowable. Instead of the customary names, material and immaterial substances, Locke recommends cogitative and incogitative substances, since it is not inconceivable that the Creator may have endowed some material beings with the capacity of thought. God, — the idea of whom is attained by uniting the ideas of existence, power, might, knowledge, and happiness with that of infinity, — is abso- lutely immaterial, because not passive, while finite spirits (which are both active and passive) are perhaps only bodies which possess the power of thinking. While the ideas of substances are referred to a reality without the mind as their archetype, to which they are to conform and which they should image and represent. Rela- tions {e. g., husband, greater) are free and immanent prod- ucts of the understanding. They are not copies of real things, but represent themselves alone, are their own arche- types. We do not ask whether they agree with things, but, conversely, whether things agree with them (Book iv. 4, 5). The mind reaches an idea of relation by placing two things side by side and comparing them. If it perceives that a thing, or a quality, or an idea begins to exist through the