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196 ENGLISH ETHICS. distinguishes the spliere of morality from that of mere law, and brings it under the law of "reputation," hence of a " tacit " agreement), and then a frivolous intensification under Mandeville and Bolingbroke. A preliminary conclu- sion is reached in the ethical labors of Hume and Smith. Richard Cumberland {De Legibus Natures, 1672) turns to experience with the questions, In what does morality con- sist ? Whence does it arise? and What is the nature of moral obligation ? and finds these answers : Those actions are good, or in conformity to the moral law of nature, which promote the common good {commune bonum summa lex). Individual welfare must be subordinated to the good of all, of which it forms only a part. The psychological roots of virtuous action are the social and disinterested affections, which nature has implanted in all beings, especially in those endowed with reason. There is nothing in man more pleas- ing to God than love. We recognize our obligation to the virtue of benevolence, or that God commands it, from the rewards and punishments which we perceive to follow the fulfillment or non-fulfillment of the law, — the subordination of individual to universal good is the only means of attain- ing true happiness and contentment. Men are dependent on mutual benevolence. He who labors for the good of the whole system of rational beings furthers thereby the wel- fare of the individual parts, among whom he himself is one ; individual happiness cannot be separated from gen- eral happiness. All duties are implied in the supreme one : Give to others, and preserve thyself. This principle of benevolence, advanced by Cumberland with homely sim- plicity, received in the later development of English ethics, for which it pointed out the way, a more careful foundation. The series of emancipations of morality begins with the Intellectual System of Ralph Cudworth {The Intellectual System of the Universe, 1678 ; A Treatise concerning Eter- nal and Immutable Morality, 1731). Ethical ideas come neither from experience nor from civil legislation nor from the will of God, but are necessary ideas in the divine and the human reason. Because of their simplicity, univer- sality, and immutability, it is impossible for them to arise from experience, which never yields anything but that ii