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SNA F TESB URY. 20 1 virtuous or vicious, according to their degree, i. e., accord- ing to the relation of their strength to that of the other affections. In itself a benevolent impulse is never too strong ; it can become so only in comparison with self-love, or in respect to the constitution of the individual in ques- tion, and conversely. Commonly the social impulses do not attain the normal standard, while the selfish exceed it ; but the opposite case also occurs. Excessive parental tender- ness, the pity which enervates and makes useless for aid, religious zeal for making converts, passionate partisanship, are examples of too violent social affections which interfere with the activity of the other inclinations. Just as errone- ous, on the other side, is the neglect of one's own good. For although the possession of selfish inclinations does not make a man virtuous, yet the lack of them is a moral defect, since they are indispensable to the general good. No one can be useful to others who does not keep himself in a con- dition for service. The impulse to care for private welfare is good and necessary in so far as it comports with the general welfare or contributes to this. The due propor- tion between the social passions, which constitute the direct source of good, and those of self-love, consists in subordi- nating the latter to the former. The kinship of this ethics of harmony with the ethical views of antiquity is evident. It is completed by the eudemonistic conclusion of the system. As the harmony of impulses constitutes the essence of virtue, so also it is the way to true happiness. Experience shows that unsocial, unsympathetic, vicious men are misera- ble ; that love to society is the richest source of happiness ; that even pity for the suffering of others occasions more pleasure than pain. Virtue secures us the love and respect of others, secures us, above all, the approval of our own conscience, and true happiness consists in satisfaction with ourselves. The search after this pure, constant, spiritual pleasure in the good, which is never accompanied by satiety and disgust, should not be called self-seeking ; he alone takes pleasure in the good who is already good him- self. Shaftesbury is not well disposed toward positive Chris-