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HUTCHESON. 205 world as gravitation in the corporeal ; and like gravitation further in that its intensity increases with propinquity — the nearer the persons, the greater the love. Benev- olence is more widespread than malevolence ; even the criminal does more innocent and kind acts in his life than criminal ones — the rarity of the latter is the reason why so much is said about them. (2) Moral judgment is also entirely uninfluenced by consideration of the advantageous or disadvantageous results for the agent or the spectator. The beauty of a good deed arouses immediate satisfaction. Through the moral sense we feel pleasure at observing a virtuous action, and aversion when we perceive an ignoble one, feelings which are independent of all thought of the rewards and punishments promised by God, as well as of the utility or harm for ourselves. Hutcheson argues a complete distinc- tion between moral approval and the perception of the agree- able and the useful, from the facts that we judge a benevo- lent action which is forced, or done from motives of personal advantage, quite differently from one inspired by love; that we pay esteem to high-minded characters whether their fortunes be good or ill ; and that we are moved with equal force by fictitious actions, as, for instance, on the stage, and by those which really take place. (3) A few further particulars may be emphasized from the comprehensive systematization which Hutcheson Indus- triously and thoughtfully gave to Shaftesbury's ideas. Two points reveal the forerunner of Hume. First, the role assigned to the reason in moral affairs is merely sub- sidiary. Our motive to action is never the knowledge of a true proposition, but always simply a wish, affection, or impulse. Ultimate ends are given by the feelings alone; the reason can only discover the means thereto. Sec- ondly, the turbulent, blind, rapidly passing passions are distinguished from the calm, permanent affections, which are mediated by cognition. The latter are the nobler; among them, in turn, the highest place is occupied by those conducive to the general good, whose worth is still further determined by the extent of their objects. From this is derived the law that a kind affection receives the