Page:History of Modern Philosophy (Falckenberg).djvu/357

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THE MAIN AND SUBORDINATE QUESTIONS. 335 Transcendental " Doctrine of Elements " {Elementariehre), in contrast to the Doctrine of Method. The Critique of Pure Reason follows this scheme of subordinate division, while the Prolegomena co-ordinates all four parts in the manner first mentioned. . Let us anticipate the answers. /Pure mathematics is possible, because there are pure or a priori intuitions (space and time), and pur e natural scien ce or the metaphysics of phenomena, because there are a priori concepts (categories) and principles of the pure understanding. ' Metaphysics^ as a presumptive science of the suprasensible has been, possible in the form of unsuccessful attempts, because Uiere are Ideas or concepts of reason which point beyondf., experience and look as though knowable objects were given through them ; but as real s cience_Jtls_not possibl_e, / because the applicatio n^"^ the_categ Qries is rest ricted to t^ii mits of expenence^jwhile the objects thought through t"he Ideas cann Qi.,li!e.^ jensuousl y given, and all assumed knowledge of them becomes involved in irresolvable con- tradictions (antinomies). On the other hand, a science is "' possible and necessary to teach the correct use of the cate- K gories, which may be applied to phenomena alone, and of the Ideas, which may be applied only to our knowledge of things (and'QHr volition), and to determine the origin and file limits of our knowledge — that is to say, a transcen- dental philosophy. In regard to metaphysics (knowledge, from pure reason), then, this is the conclusion reached : Rejection of transcendent metaphysics (that which goes Ueyond ""experience), recognition and development of immanent metaphysics (that which remains within the ' limits of possible experience). It is not possible as a . metaphysic of things in themselves ; it is possible as a metaphysic of nature (of the totality of phenom- ena), and as a metaphysic of knowledge (critique of reason). The interests of the reason are not exhausted, however, -^ by the question, What can we know? but include two further questions, What ought we to do? and, What may we hope ? Thus to the metaphysics of nature there is added a metaphysics of morals, and to the critique <^