Page:History of Modern Philosophy (Falckenberg).djvu/364

343 KANT. only in time. It is no less false that space is abstracted from the empirical space relations of external phenomena, their existence outside and beside one another, or in dif- ferent places, for it is impossible to represent relative situa- tion except in space. Therefore experience does not make space and time possible ; but space and time first of all make experience possible, the one outer, the other inner experience. They are postulates of perception, not abstrac- tions from it. (2) Time is a necessary representation a priori. We can easily think all phenomena away from it, but we cannot remove time itself in view of phenomena in ge"neral ; we can think time without phenomena, but not phenomena without time. The same is true of space in reference to external objects. Both are conditions of the possibility of phenomena. (3) Time is not a discursive or general concept. For there is but one tim e. And different times do not precede the one time as the constituent parts of which it is made up, but are mere limitations of it ; the part is possible only through the whole. In the same way the various spaces are only parts of one and the same space, and can be thought in it alone. But a repres- entation which can be given only by a single object is a par- ticular representation or an intuition. Because, therefore, of the oneness of space and time, t jie representation of ea ch. is an int uition. The a priori, immediateintuition of the one' space is entirely different from the empirical, general con-i ce£tion of space, which is abstracted from the various spaces. (4) Determinate periods of time arise by limita- tion of the one, fundamental time. Consequently this /original time must be unlimited or infinite, and the repres- y "cntation of it must be an intuition, not a concept. Time contains in itself an endless number of representations (its parts, times), but this is never the case with a generic con- cept, which, indeed, is contained as a partial representation in an endless number of representations (those of the indi- viduals having the same name), and, consequently, compre- hends them all under itself, but which never contains them in itself. The general concept horse is contained in each particular representation of a horse as a general character- istic, and that of justice in each representation of a definite