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THINGS IN THEMSELVES, PHENOMENA. 351 , must represent the world, so it is, though for us, of course, T and not in itself. Many places in Kant's works seem to argue against the intermediate position here ascribed to the world of phe- nomena — according to which it is less than things in themselves and more than subjective representation—*^ ' which, since they explain the phenomenon as a mere repres- entation, leave room for only two factors (on the one hand,, the thing in itself = that in the thing which cannot be repre- sented ; on the other, the thing for me = my representation of the thing). In fact, the distinction between the phe- nomenon "itself "and the representation which the indi- vidual now has of it and now does not have, is far from being everywhere adhered to with desirable clearness ; and wherever it is impossible to substitute that which has been represented and that which may be represented, or possi- ble intuitions for " mere representations in me,'j( we must acknowledge that there is a departure from the stand- point which is assumed in some places with the greatest dis- tinctness. The latter finds unequivocal expression, among other places, in the " Analogies of Experience " and the " Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding," § 2, No. 4 (first edition). The second of these passages spsaks of one and the same universal experience, in which all perceptions are represented in thoroughgoing and regu- lar connection, and of the thoroughgoing affinity of phe- nomena as the basis of the possibility of the association of representations. This affinity is ascribed to the objects of the senses, not to the representations, whose association is rather the result of the affinity, and not to the things in themselves, in regard to which the understanding has no legislative power. The relation between the thing jjO-it^e If aad the phenom- enon is also variable. Now they are regarded as entirely Irfterogeneous (that which can never be intuited exists in a mode opposed to that of the intuited and intuitable), and now as analogous to each other (non-intuitable properties of the thing in itself correspond to the intuitable character- istics of the phenomenon). The former is the case when it is said that phenomena are in space and time, while things I