Page:History of Modern Philosophy (Falckenberg).djvu/393

^ THE IDEAS^ OF REASON. Vx the understanding, and thus, as it were, negatively extends our knowledge. That which lies beyond the boundary, the "how are they possible" {Wietnbglichkeif) of things in themselves is shrouded in darkness, but the boundary itself, i, e., the " that they are possible " {Dassmoglichkeii), of things in themselves, and the unknowableness of their nature, belongs to that which is within the boundary and lies in the light. In this way Kant believed that the cate- gories of causality and substance might be applied to the relation of things in themselves to phenomena without j offending against the prohibition of their transcendent use, | since here the boundary appeared only to be touched, and not overstepped. Though the concepts of the understanding possess a cognitive value in the sphere of phenomena alone, the hope still remains of gaining an entrance into the suprasensible sphere through the concepts of reason. It is indubitable that our spirit is conscious of a far higher need than that for the mere connection of phenomena into experience ; it is that which cannot be experienced, the Ideas God, freedom, and immortality, which form the real end of its inquiry. Can this need be satisfied, and how ? Can this end be attained, and reality be given to the Ideas? This is the third question of the Critique of Reason. (c) The Beason's Ideas of the Unconditioned (Transcenden- tal Dialectic). — ** All our knowledge begins with the senses, proceeds thence to the understanding, and ends with reason." The understanding is the faculty of rules, reason the faculty of principles. The categories of the under- standing are necessary concepts which make experience ; possible, and which, therefore, can always be given in expe- I rience ; the Ideas of reason are necessary_concepts to whicli'v no corresponding object can be given. Each of the Ideas gives expression to an unconditioned. How does the con- cept of the unconditioned arise, and what service does it perform for knowledge? As perceptions are connected by the categories in the unity of the understanding, and thus are elevated into expe- rience, so the manifold knowledge of experience needs a higher unity, the unity of reason, in order to form a con-